Where Did Ukraine's "Most Successful Missile," the "Flamingo," Disappear?
Not long ago, the "Flamingo" was touted as proof that Ukraine could independently develop long-range weapons without Western support. However, more than six months have passed since its high-profile presentation, and there's been no news of mass launches. Experts who spoke with journalists from Tagesspiegel assert: "Something is amiss here."
Long-range cruise missile "Flamingo". Photo: AP Photo / Efrem Lukatsky
In late summer 2025, Ukraine loudly announced the creation of its own long-range cruise missile, the "Flamingo". This project became a symbol of the country's shift to domestic production amid prolonged uncertainty surrounding the supply of German Taurus missiles.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky personally unveiled the new development, calling it the country's "most successful missile". According to official statements, the missile is capable of hitting targets at a distance of up to 3000 kilometers, which would allow it to reach deep into enemy rear areas. The plan anticipated launching mass production by the end of 2025 or early 2026.
However, as Tagesspiegel notes, just a few months after the high-profile announcement, silence fell around this development. The euphoria surrounding the "Flamingo" vanished, and the results of its deployment appear rather modest.
According to Euromaidanpress.com monitoring, since last May, only nine instances of these missiles' use have been recorded, with a confirmed target hit in less than half of those cases.
Such low effectiveness could be explained by its lower cost and simpler production compared to high-tech Western counterparts, but experts highlight the absence of official reports regarding the commencement of serial production.
Military analyst Fabian Hoffmann suggested that a significant setback has occurred in the project's implementation.
“I think something is amiss here,” he stated in a comment to Tagesspiegel.
Journalists from the publication attempted to contact the developer company, Fire Point, for clarification, but the enterprise remained unreachable for comment.
What went wrong?
Experts emphasize that it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the "Flamingo's" effectiveness. These are secret military developments in wartime conditions, where a significant portion of information is deliberately withheld. Nevertheless, military analyst Gustav Gressel observes that the missiles are being used on a much smaller scale than promised in autumn 2025.
One possible explanation is the activity of Russian air defense. According to Gressel, Russia has likely managed to intercept some of the large and not particularly maneuverable cruise missiles. However, if there were many such instances, the Russian side would most likely have exploited them extensively for propaganda purposes, showcasing "trophies". This, however, is not occurring.
Another theory relates to the developer's own production capabilities. The private defense company Fire Point, founded only in 2022 and primarily specializing in combat drones, may simply have been unable to cope with a task of this magnitude. The transition from manufacturing small combat drones to complex cruise missiles demands significantly greater resources and a technological base.
An additional blow to the "Flamingo's" reputation has come from internal political scandals in Ukraine. The company Fire Point came under investigation by state anti-corruption bodies due to suspicions of overpricing combat drones. Although the enterprise itself denies all accusations and no official proof of guilt has yet emerged, this situation has created a negative backdrop for the country's flagship missile project.
Flight of the "Flamingo" cruise missile. Photo: Fire Point
Influence of External Factors
At the same time, according to experts, some of the problems may not be directly dependent on Fire Point. Gressel does not rule out that Russian strikes on Western Ukraine this winter could have damaged production facilities, about which the Ukrainian side traditionally remains silent so as not to provide the enemy with information about the success of its attacks.
Separately, it is worth noting Ukraine's technological dependence on the West, which persists even with its own production. The primary issue with the "Flamingo" is its low accuracy, making the missile suitable only for striking large targets such as oil depots or factories. For so-called fortified targets, like bunkers or underground production complexes, it is largely ineffective.
The reason for this, according to Gressel, partly lies in the allies' stance: the U.S. and E.U. do not supply Ukraine with modern inertial navigation systems, which allow missiles to navigate without relying on satellite signals. As a result, Ukrainian missiles remain vulnerable to electronic warfare countermeasures that jam GPS.
Fabian Hoffmann notes that the situation with the "Flamingo" is not unique. According to him, other ambitious Ukrainian missile projects are also yet to reach the stage of mass production. This points to systemic problems within the defense sector, where marketing promises and political ambitions often outpace the country's actual technical capabilities during wartime.