"They see Belarus as part of Russia." What the rise of "Alternative for Germany" means, how far it can go, and how Belarusians should position themselves
The victory of the "Alternative for Germany" party in Saxony-Anhalt does not yet signify the rapid ascent of the ultra-right to power across Germany and a new pact with the Kremlin. However, it indicates that Europe's political landscape is changing. This is not just about migration or social issues. Support for Ukraine and anti-Lukashenka Belarusians is no longer taken for granted. There are those who are openly against it. And the main risk for Belarusians is that at some point Berlin might decide: Belarus is simply part of the Russian sphere, let's forget about it. "Nasha Niva" asked analysts: how realistic is such a scenario.
Illustrative image generated with neural networks
"Alternative for Germany" received 43.8% of the votes in the Saxony-Anhalt elections — the best result for the ultra-right in state elections in post-war Germany. The party was just three mandates short of an absolute majority. How realistic is its rise to power across the entire country, and would such a rise signify a rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow? And would such a rapprochement come at the cost of Eastern Europe?
Political earthquake
Just five years ago, "Alternative for Germany" received 20.8% of the votes in the former East German state of Saxony-Anhalt. Now its result has more than doubled — to 43.8%. AfD secured 39 out of 83 seats in the state parliament. For an independent majority, 42 are needed.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz's Christian Democratic Union garnered only 17.2%. For a party that won here in the previous elections with 37.1%, this is a real failure.
"This is a political earthquake. Even 43.8% for AfD is not such a big sensation, as polls predicted over 40% for it. The real catastrophe is the result of the Christian Democrats," says historian and political observer Alexander Friedmann.
"Alternative for Germany" emerged in 2013 as a Euroskeptic party protesting against the bailout of eurozone countries at the expense of German taxpayers. Today, AfD demands maximum restrictions on migration, the return of some powers from the EU level to national states, the abandonment of current climate and energy policies, the development of nuclear energy, and support for the traditional family. In foreign policy, the party opposes military aid to Ukraine, demands the lifting of sanctions against Russia, and the restoration of economic cooperation with it.
A peculiarity of the situation is also that the Saxony-Anhalt state branch of AfD has been considered "proven right-extremist" by the local Office for the Protection of the Constitution since 2023. In the agency's recent report, it was named the biggest threat to democracy in this federal state.
However, 43.8% does not yet mean that AfD has automatically gained power. Traditional parties have long adhered to a "sanitary cordon" principle, refusing to form coalitions with it. But now they themselves do not have enough votes to form a stable majority.
The "Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance," which won five mandates, could be decisive. If AfD is called right-populist, ASW is left-populist. This party criticizes sanctions against Russia and calls for the restoration of economic relations with Moscow. Theoretically, its votes would be enough to bring AfD to power in Magdeburg.
Why Germans vote for AfD
Alexander Friedmann sees the election results as evidence of deep German dissatisfaction with the country's economic situation.
The German economy has been stagnating for several years: businesses are closing, jobs are being cut, and the automotive industry is in a difficult position. Economic uncertainty is compounded by competition from migrants for jobs, the fear of losing their previous standard of living, and disillusionment with the government's ability to change anything. This is particularly strongly felt in the former GDR states, where wages and accumulated wealth are still lower than in the west of the country.
"People are losing the feeling that they live in a country that belongs to them. There is a fear that the social and economic situation will only worsen, and the government is unable to solve the problems," explains Friedmann.
Alexander Friedmann. Photo: baj.media
AfD managed to consolidate these fears into simple election slogans: close borders, deport illegal migrants, abandon expensive climate policy, bring back cheap gas, and stop spending money on foreign wars. Separately, the argument that Berlin finds billions for weapons and aid to Ukraine but no money for its own citizens resonated.
"The government will now have to explain much more and better why support for Ukraine is important for Germany itself. The explanation that has been given so far has clearly not worked," notes Alexander Friedmann.
Rudkouski does not consider AfD to be radicals
Political scientist Piotr Rudkouski suggests looking at AfD's success differently. He believes that the terms "radical right" and "national populists" are often used as labels that explain little about the party's program content.
"If we put aside emotions and ideological glasses, we will see a program that in many points could have belonged to the Christian Democratic Union of the 1990s or early 2000s," believes Rudkouski.
In his opinion, some decisions of previous authorities were radical: the abandonment of nuclear energy while simultaneously depending on Russian gas, the expensive energy transition, and the reception of more than a million migrants in 2015 without sufficiently effective integration mechanisms. Therefore, Piotr Rudkouski calls AfD's success a reaction to the radicalism of previous years.
Alexander Friedmann, in turn, points to another trend: while some European right-wing parties, given a chance at power, become more moderate, AfD is moving in the opposite direction.
"In Italy and partly in France, we observe a deradicalization of the right. AfD, on the contrary, is becoming increasingly radical. Therefore, even Italian and French right-wing parties do not want to cooperate with it," he says.
What "Alternative for Germany" can actually change
Saxony-Anhalt is a state with a population of about two million people and little economic weight. Even if AfD forms a government there, it will not be able to independently stop German aid to Ukraine, cancel sanctions against Russia, or withdraw Germany from NATO. Foreign policy falls under the competence of the federal government.
However, state authorities have significant influence over education, culture, police, local media, and administrative work.
AfD promised to resume school exchanges with Russia and expand the teaching of the Russian language. The party also proposed transferring refugee children with uncertain status to separate classes, and children with disabilities to special schools.
"They can indeed try to implement this. But AfD coming to power in Magdeburg does not mean that Germany will immediately stop aid to Ukraine. Economic consequences are also possible. Some foreign companies may refuse to invest in a state governed by a right-extremist party. AfD itself understands this," emphasizes Alexander Friedmann.
The party faces a dilemma. Its leadership wants to come to power for the first time, but a significant portion of its radical promises cannot be fulfilled within the powers of the state government and German law. Actual governance might show voters that there are no simple solutions, ultimately weakening AfD's support.
Can "Alternative for Germany" take power across the entire country
A victory in one eastern state does not yet mean an inevitable victory across the entire country. AfD's results in the East are traditionally significantly higher than in the West. It will be difficult for the party to repeat 43.8% in federal elections in the near future.
But it should not be underestimated either. In the 2025 Bundestag elections, AfD received over 20% of the votes and became the country's second political force. Now its rating has already surpassed the CDU/CSU.
The main obstacle for AfD remains the lack of acceptable coalition partners. As long as the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Greens, and Left refuse to cooperate with it, a mere first place in elections is not enough.
The situation will change if the "sanitary cordon" begins to crumble — for example, part of the CDU decides that it is better to enter into a coalition with AfD than to form unstable governments with ideologically distant parties. Another scenario is a tactical alliance of AfD with Sahra Wagenknecht's left populists. Piotr Rudkouski considers this the most favorable for Germany's shift towards normalizing relations with Moscow.
Here arises a historical parallel with interwar Germany. It is incorrect to equate AfD with the Nazi party, but individual political mechanisms can be compared: the division of society into "true people" and "outsiders," the search for culprits among minorities and migrants — only then it was Jews and Slavs, the promise of national revival, attacks on media and the political establishment, the gradual expansion of the boundaries of what is considered permissible in public politics.
Another disturbing parallel is the hope of traditional conservatives that a radical party can be allowed into power, its popularity exploited, and then kept under control. A similar line of reasoning was held by some German conservative elites before Hitler's appointment as chancellor in January 1933. In Hitler's first government, Nazis received only three posts, and their partners were convinced they could limit the new chancellor. However, within a few months, the Nazis destroyed parliamentary democracy.
But it cannot be said that Germany is repeating the path of 1933. The modern country fundamentally differs from the Weimar Republic: it has strong courts, a federal system, free media, and constitutional mechanisms created partly to prevent a new dictatorship.
"Even AfD coming to state power does not mean that independent justice and free media will disappear tomorrow. The party does not have such capabilities. I am not even sure that it has the desire to go that far," says Alexander Friedmann.
Will Germany and Russia again divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence
Another historical fear is a possible agreement between Berlin and Moscow behind the backs of the states between them.
There are no grounds to expect that Germany and Russia will literally draw new borders on a map today. Germany is bound by its membership in the EU and NATO, and its modern state structure fundamentally differs from the Third Reich. But in the 21st century, the division of spheres of influence does not necessarily look like a secret protocol. It can happen differently: through the cessation of support for Ukraine, the recognition of Russian conquests, the resumption of economic cooperation with Moscow, and tacit consent that Belarus remains in the Russian sphere of control.
Alexander Friedmann notes that AfD is primarily interested in Russia, not Belarus.
"Some of its deputies have visited Belarus and sent inquiries to the German government, including about funding Belarusian democratic forces. However, for the AfD leadership in Saxony-Anhalt, Belarus remains a marginal topic. If you asked Ulrich Sigmund about Belarus, he would most likely not be able to say much. They are interested in Russia.
If they perceive Belarus at all, it's within the Russian context. AfD has a very Russocentric view of Eastern Europe and especially of Belarus," says Friedmann.
What will happen to Lukashenka and democratic forces
Piotr Rudkouski does not expect that in the event of AfD's participation in the government, Germany will instantly open up to Lukashenka's regime. But attempts at limited normalization are possible, especially where it would allow reducing costs for German business or solving specific security problems. For example, AfD representatives could lobby for concessions to Minsk in exchange for ending migration blackmail at the EU borders.
Much more likely is another consequence — a reduction in support for Belarusian democratic forces, independent media, and public organizations.
"From the logic of AfD's program, it follows that Belarusian NGOs can be perceived as the business of Belarusians themselves, to whom German taxpayers owe nothing," says Rudkouski.
Piotr Rudkouski. Photo: Budzma Belarusami
And for such a shift, AfD does not necessarily have to be in government itself. Its rise is already forcing traditional parties to adopt its agenda, not only on migration but also on foreign aid.
What will happen to Belarusians in Germany
For Belarusians living in Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD's rise to state power could have specific consequences, especially for people with uncertain migration status, refugees, and families with children.
Belarusians are not a specific target of the party. Its rhetoric is primarily directed against migrants from Asian countries and refugees from Ukraine, who are accused of exploiting the German social system.
Moreover, the expert says, some Russian-speaking citizens of Germany, including some natives of Belarus, themselves support AfD. They do not always apply anti-migration rhetoric to themselves, as they consider themselves integrated, work, pay taxes, and respect laws. However, with an overall increase in restrictions, the difference between "good" and "bad" migrants may not be so obvious.
"It cannot be said that without AfD, Germany will remain completely open, and with AfD, it will suddenly close. Migration burden and administrative problems are already forcing authorities to introduce restrictions. The difference is that AfD talks about it openly, while traditional forces do the same more quietly," believes Piotr Rudkouski.
The expert believes that the most real threats to Belarusians are a decrease in support for democratic Belarus.
What is the right tactic for Belarusians regarding AfD
Alexander Friedmann calls for not panicking. AfD has not yet even formed a state government in the East German state, and its capabilities are limited by law and strong democratic institutions.
"This is a serious challenge for German democracy, but the danger should not be exaggerated yet. The situation should be assessed rationally and calmly," says Alexander Friedmann.
Piotr Rudkouski sees the right-wing shift as a signal for Belarusian democratic forces: the old rhetoric of "we are victims of the regime, so help us" will work less and less. In his opinion, Belarusians should be less involved in Europe's internal ideological wars and explain more about how democratic Belarus and the Belarusian diaspora are useful to Europeans themselves.
"It is necessary to show that Belarusians in the EU are doctors, engineers, IT specialists, and builders who work, pay taxes, respect laws, and integrate easily. And democratic Belarus is not only a victim that needs help but a potential ally in ensuring regional security and economic stability," says Rudkouski.