Trump's Deal with Putin: What Ukraine and Belarus Might Pay for It
Could Trump really hand Ukraine over to Moscow? Is he trying to replicate Nixon's maneuver in reverse — to draw closer to Russia to pull it away from China? And what would then happen to Belarus, which is often perceived by those in Trump's circle as part of the Russian sphere?
First, Vladimir Putin proposed a trilateral meeting in China — with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping — to discuss, among other things, an end to the war in Ukraine, but without Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the Europeans. Then Trump stated that he was not against such a meeting and added: perhaps Ukraine already needs someone else for negotiations.
But on October 21, the plot took another turn. After a meeting between American special envoy Steve Whitkoff and Putin, Moscow agreed in principle to resume negotiations with Ukraine and the USA. Zelenskyy also supported this format. Negotiations could begin in November, although the main contradictions — territories, security guarantees, the future of Donbas — have not disappeared.
Could Trump really hand Ukraine over to Moscow? Is he trying to replicate Nixon's maneuver in reverse — to draw closer to Russia to pull it away from China? And what would then happen to Belarus, which is often perceived by those in Trump's circle as part of the Russian sphere?
"Nasha Niva" discussed this with Hryhoriy Nizhnikov, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and Andrei Kazakevich, Doctor of Political Sciences and Director of the Institute of Political Sphere.
"Saying 'take Ukraine' is possible. But how to do it?"
Hryhoriy Nizhnikov advises against perceiving every sharp statement by Trump as an already adopted geopolitical decision. In his opinion, the current rhetoric of the American president is largely aimed at a domestic audience ahead of the November congressional elections.
At the same time, this does not make the pressure on Ukraine less dangerous. Washington can cut aid, delay supplies, limit access to intelligence, and push Kyiv towards a painful compromise. But there is a big distance between Trump's desire to conclude a deal and his ability to impose it.
"Trump cannot decide Ukraine's fate without Ukraine. I put a period here. Even if he tells Putin tomorrow: 'Okay, take Ukraine,' the most difficult question will remain: how to do it? As long as Ukraine is ready to fight and receives European aid, a decision made behind its back will not definitively solve anything. It will make the war harder, but it will not stop the struggle for independence," Nizhnikov is convinced.
Even a complete cessation of American aid would not lead to an immediate collapse: Ukraine has its own army and defense industry, and a significant part of foreign support now comes from Europe.
Andrei Kazakevich evaluates the White House's intentions more cautiously. In his opinion, Trump has neither ethical nor political taboos against discussing Ukraine without its participation.
"If this administration believes it's easier to talk directly with Putin or Xi Jinping, it will do so. The question is different: can this guarantee peace? There is no certainty that such things can be agreed upon at all without Ukraine and Europe," the expert says.
Why Trump pressures Zelenskyy, not Putin
The most noticeable feature of Trump's politics is the unevenness of pressure. Trump talks to Putin as a potential partner, and to Zelenskyy as a problematic subordinate. He much more often accuses Kyiv of unwillingness to end the war than he demands concessions from the country that started it.
Hryhoriy Nizhnikov sees a simple logic here: Ukraine can be influenced quickly, while pressure on Moscow takes time and can be costly for the United States itself.
"Putin can be pressured, but Trump has no instrument that would give an instant effect. Sanctions and tariffs can be imposed against buyers of Russian oil, but this will affect China and hit the United States itself. Therefore, Trump pressures the weaker party. Zelenskyy is dependent on the US in certain matters, and Trump uses this."
Personal grievances are mixed with political calculation. The Ukrainian issue was at the center of Trump's first impeachment in 2019. Later, the relationship between the two presidents repeatedly escalated into public conflict. Hryhoriy Nizhnikov believes that Trump perceives some of Zelenskyy's statements as a personal insult and does not intend to forget them.
Putin, on the other hand, offers Trump what he values: a conversation between "strong leaders," the prospect of a big deal, economic projects, and quick symbolic success.
"Trump respects Putin as strong. Putin offers Trump golden mountains — in fact, one political bribe after another. Therefore, in Trump's logic, Zelenskyy must be pressured, and with Putin, one must negotiate," the expert reflects.
And it doesn't matter whether Trump can actually deliver on everything he promises Moscow. Putin wins just from the process itself. He stops looking like an isolated aggressor and returns to the role of a person with whom the fate of Europe is discussed. Even without a peace treaty, Moscow can obtain sanctions relief, a split between the US and Europe, and the status of an equal participant in the "peace process."
Why this is not yet a new Yalta
The possible meeting of Trump, Putin, and Xi has already been called a new Yalta: three great powers dividing the world, while the countries they talk about wait outside the door.
But the analogy is lame. In 1945, the leaders of the victorious coalition sat at the table. Now there are no victors, no common coalition, no shared vision for the future.
"For Yalta, a coalition of victors is needed, deciding what the world will be like after the war. Here, there is no victory yet, and the interests of Trump, Putin, and Xi are very different. Therefore, Yalta as an agreement on the division of spheres of influence is currently impossible," believes Andrei Kazakevich.
Putin wants to secure exclusive rights over the post-Soviet space for Russia. But the countries of the region themselves resist this: Ukraine – with weapons, Azerbaijan – by distancing itself from Moscow, Central Asian states – by maneuvering between Russia, China, the West, and Turkey.
Trump wants a quick deal that can be sold to the American voter as his own victory. Xi Jinping could gain the status of one of the leaders without whom global crises can no longer be resolved. However, it is unclear why he would help Trump solidify Russian claims to Eastern Europe. China does not claim an exclusive sphere of influence here and can simply wait until Washington's positions weaken even further.
"The Chinese believe that time is on their side. Why should they negotiate now, when in a year their position could be even better? And why conclude a major agreement with Trump if in two or three years there will be another president in the US and they will have to negotiate again?" says Hryhoriy Nizhnikov.
A trilateral meeting could happen, but for now, a summit with loud statements and photo opportunities seems more realistic. However,
even such a format would be a gift to Putin: it returns him to the club of leaders who supposedly determine the future of the world and pushes aside the question of responsibility for aggression.
At the same time, Hryhoriy Nizhnikov sees a deeper process: the international order is indeed falling apart.
"Usually, superpowers decline gradually. Here, for the first time, we are witnessing a world leader rapidly destroying his own positions. Trump does this very effectively. We don't yet know what order will replace it, but it will no longer be the same," the expert states.
Can Ukraine be traded for a split between Moscow and Beijing?
Trump's behavior is often explained by the "reverse Nixon" strategy. In the 1970s, the US moved to rapprochement with China to deepen its split with the USSR. Now, some people in Trump's circle propose a mirrored maneuver: to agree with Russia and detach it from China.
Andrei Kazakevich confirms: such an idea is indeed being discussed in American political and expert circles. Its proponents believe that previous administrations themselves pushed Moscow towards Beijing.
But Washington cannot offer Moscow the same thing as Beijing without undermining its own security and the security of its European allies.
"Russia's dependence on China is multifaceted. The United States will not be able to replace China for Moscow. They will not buy the same volumes of oil and gas from Russia that Beijing buys, and they will not be able to supply Moscow with many high technologies and military-purpose technologies. The slogan itself is beautiful and has supporters, but it's unclear how it could look in reality," explains Andrei Kazakevich.
Hryhoriy Nizhnikov speaks even more sharply:
"This is armchair geopolitics. There are no prerequisites for detaching Russia from China. If someone in the American administration truly believes in such a possibility, it only demonstrates their unprofessionalism."
The main danger of such an approach is that Putin might accept American concessions and give nothing in return. Russia would get sanctions relief, trade opportunities, and political legitimacy, while maintaining a strategic partnership with China. Ukraine, in such a scheme, risks paying for a deal that, in reality, won't happen.
Can the US stop Trump?
Donald Trump has broad powers in foreign policy, but he does not control it entirely. Congress controls the budget, can enshrine sanctions in law, conduct investigations, and limit funding for specific decisions.
Hryhoriy Nizhnikov suggests that after the November elections, Trump's room for maneuver could narrow. Even a partial Democratic victory would give Congress more tools for oversight.
"Trump can pretend to have unlimited capabilities, but that's not the case. He depends on public opinion and is limited by American institutions. He is not capable of unilaterally making a decision that would completely overturn policy regarding Ukraine, NATO, Russia, and China."
However, the US could descend into internal political conflict. This would complicate Trump's grand deal but make the country less capable of supporting allies.
Therefore, Ukraine is most likely not to be "sold" with a single signature. Its situation could worsen gradually: aid delays, softening sanctions against Moscow, limiting access to American technologies, and demanding new concessions from Kyiv.
For some Trumpists, Belarus is already "just a part of Russia"
Andrei Kazakevich researched the approaches of analytical centers close to MAGA — Donald Trump's political movement, whose name comes from the slogan Make America Great Again. The expert spoke with representatives of this circle and, according to him, Belarus and Ukraine are perceived very differently there.
"The overwhelming majority perceives Ukraine as an independent, sovereign country. Regarding Belarus, the stereotype that it is simply a part of Russia dominates. For them, Belarus is a satellite country, completely unlike Ukraine, which precisely does not want to be a Russian satellite," says the expert.
Thus, Belarus's dependence on Moscow is perceived as a completely natural state that does not require correction.
The Trump administration established a separate dialogue with Lukashenka. Minsk released some political prisoners, the US eased some sanctions, and the first shipment of Belarusian potash in four years headed to New Orleans via a Russian port.
Theoretically, access to Western markets could give Minsk more freedom from Moscow. In practice, exports remain tied to Russian logistics. Belarus receives currency, Russia gets transit, economic benefit, and an additional argument for lifting sanctions.
Hryhoriy Nizhnikov calls the Belarusian-American track counterproductive. In his opinion, it did not stop repressions, did not diminish Belarus's participation in Russian military infrastructure, and did not weaken its dependence on Moscow.
"Lukashenka gained personal benefits from this process, but not benefits for Belarusian statehood. The threat to Belarusian sovereignty is only increasing. We should not cover this up by saying that he released a few hundred political prisoners. Otherwise, we start playing by Lukashenka's and Putin's rules: release a person — and propose to turn a blind eye to everything else," the expert believes.
The Belarusian track could become a testing ground for a larger deal with Moscow. If sanctions against Minsk are softened in exchange for the release of political prisoners, a similar formula could be offered to Russia — the release of people or another specific concession in exchange for economic relief.
"The Belarusian track has become a kind of dynamite under Russian sanctions. Any progress in negotiations with Minsk can be used as an argument for why restrictions should also be lifted from Russia. For Putin, a positive Belarusian-American dialogue is entirely beneficial," Hryhoriy Nizhnikov believes.
Moreover, the Americans could present Belarusian potash as a bonus for Moscow itself: Lukashenka will get money, meaning Russia will have to spend less on his support.
Hryhoriy Nizhnikov calls such a proposal "Ostap Bender-esque":
"For the Russian leadership, Belarus is already under its control anyway. And here they are trying to sell him what he already considers his own: allegedly, your Lukashenka will get money, and it will be profitable for you. Moscow might respond: we will do whatever we want with him, even without you."
Andrei Kazakevich does not believe that Belarus can be successfully sold to Kyiv and the EU as an example of "acceptable peace":
"Submission to Moscow occurred with the consent of the Belarusian leadership and was part of Minsk's foreign policy for three decades. Ukraine, on the contrary, does not want to be a Russian satellite and has been offering armed resistance to this for many years."
Europe is capable of supporting Ukraine. If it doesn't split itself
Even a further reduction in American support does not mean an automatic defeat for Ukraine. European countries, along with Great Britain and Norway, have already spent more on supporting Ukraine than the United States. According to the Ukraine Support Tracker, from the beginning of the full-scale war until August 2026, European aid amounted to 236 billion euros, American aid — 115 billion.
At the same time, there remain areas where the US role is critical: intelligence, satellite systems, individual air defense systems, and some types of weaponry.
"It turned out that Europeans can support Ukraine without Americans. Europe has made ten steps forward since 2022. It should have made thirty, but these ten are already much more than expected," says Hryhoriy Nizhnikov.
He sees the main threat in a possible political split within Europe itself. Russia counts on the strengthening of "Alternative for Germany," Marine Le Pen's National Rally in France, and other forces that demand an end to support for Ukraine and a restoration of relations with Moscow.
The weakening of European unity is beneficial to both Moscow and some Trumpists. A fragmented Europe will find it harder to support Kyiv, influence peace terms, and pursue a separate policy regarding Belarus.
"For Ukraine and Belarus, a greater threat is not a specific statement by Trump, but the coming to power of anti-European forces that will begin to destroy Europe's overall geopolitical capability, which emerged after the Russian invasion," says Hryhoriy Nizhnikov.
What will the end of the war change for Belarus
The main danger for Belarusians lies not even in a possible deal between Trump and Putin; Belarus can remain in Russia's sphere of influence even without an agreement — through continued war, isolation, and increasing dependence on Moscow.
Andrei Kazakevich believes that the protracted military conflict means long-term stagnation and backwardness for Belarus. Individual enterprises linked to the Russian military-industrial complex may earn, but Belarus as a whole loses markets, investments, specialists, and development opportunities.
"As long as the war continues, there will be no real normalization of Belarus's relations with Western countries. Isolation and sanctions will remain, and there will be few opportunities for development," says the expert.
The war also supports the internal logic of repression. The authorities can release individual political prisoners and simultaneously detain new ones, maintaining an atmosphere of continuous emergency in the country. Peace alone will not make Belarus democratic. However, it can create a practical need for Minsk to normalize relations with Poland, Lithuania, and other EU countries. Large-scale and demonstrative repressions will hinder this.
"If the Belarusian authorities want to normalize relations with Europe, they will be forced to engage in internal political de-escalation. As long as the war continues, the corridor for agreements is very narrow: individual logistical projects, cross-border cooperation. To stop repressions, military actions must stop," concludes Andrei Kazakevich.
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