Why Russia Attacks Ukraine with "Shaheds" During the Day: Tactic Change with Mesh Systems and "Swarm" Flights
Russia continues to use the Shahed kamikaze attack drone (also known as "Geran") as its primary and mass means for air strikes deep into Ukrainian territory. At the same time, the Kremlin is not only actively developing new modifications of this UAV but also experimenting with tactics, for example, launching hundreds of drones during daylight hours, writes military analyst of the BBC Ukrainian Service Oleh Chernysh.
Collage: BBC Ukrainian Service
Since autumn 2022, when Russia first used a "Shahed" to strike Ukraine, it has undergone significant changes.
This UAV received special antennas for countering electronic warfare (EW), an increased warhead, and the ability to be controlled in online mode.
In addition, the Russians are gradually increasing the frequency of using "Shaheds" with jet engines, which have twice the speed of conventional piston models.
Depending on the modification, its speed can range from 300 to 600 km/h. However, jet UAVs have a shorter range, so Russia usually uses them only for strikes in border regions.
According to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, since spring this year, Russia has been changing its tactics for using "Shaheds". What are the main changes?
Daytime Attacks
Throughout March and early April, Russia conducted several previously untypical massive daytime attacks with long-range drones.
Typically, Russian drone operators would start launching them in batches from several directions from evening until the morning of the next day.
During these 10-12 hours, an average of about 250-350 attack UAVs flew into Ukraine, of which 60-70% were "Shaheds". Their shoot-down statistics in recent months have been quite high - around 80-90%.
For example, according to the statistics of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the first week of April, Russia launched about 1.3 thousand "Shaheds", of which about 150 hit their targets.
However, last month, Russia twice attempted a continuous 24-hour "Shahed" attack, meaning they launched them in successive waves not only at night but also during daylight hours.
In particular, from 6 PM on March 23 to the same time the next day, almost 1,000 attack drones flew into Ukraine, of which about 600 were "Shaheds".
On that day, they attacked almost all regions, including reaching the western regions and striking Lviv, Lutsk, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk.
A similar attack occurred from the evening of March 31 to the evening of April 1. During those 24 hours, the Russians used about 700 attack UAVs, of which 450 were "Shaheds".
On other days in March and April, daytime attacks also occurred but were not as massive and were mainly focused on frontline regions: Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk.
At the same time, the shoot-down rate during massive daytime attacks remained consistently high and even higher than during night attacks. For example, on March 24, air defense managed to shoot down/suppress as many as 97% of enemy drones.
So, what was the point of this change in tactics?
Deputy Head of the President's Office General Pavlo Palisa believes that Russia is doing this exclusively for "terrorizing the civilian population" and causing greater economic damage.
"The Russians began to combine night attacks with daytime ones in order to inflict more casualties on the civilian population. More pressure on the civilian population... There is also an economic component here. Massive attacks in the middle of a working day significantly paralyze business," he said in an interview with "RBC-Ukraine".
During attacks on the western regions of Ukraine, civilian objects were primarily affected, particularly in crowded central areas of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk.
During a daytime raid, losses of air assets will always be significantly greater than during a night attack, aviation expert Valeriy Romanenko told the BBC Ukrainian Service.
This is due to the fact that such targets do not need additional illumination in the night sky; they are easier to see and "hunt", for example, from a helicopter. This means it is easier to shoot down "Shaheds" during the day.
"There was no military sense in this. The only thing the Russians could hope for was that after a massive night raid, the crews of anti-aircraft systems and mobile fire groups would be tired and unable to work effectively during the day," he believes.
However, besides "terrorizing the population," there is another reason why Russia continues daytime attacks despite their questionable effectiveness.
What are "Mesh Networks"?
The fact is that in daylight, "Shahed" operators have more opportunities to hit a moving target by controlling them via so-called "Mesh-Networks".
A conventional "Shahed" has no connection with the operator and flies along a route to a stationary target, for example, an oil depot, which may be reliably protected by object air defense.
The chances of a single UAV breaking through this defense are quite small. In such a situation, the probability of success only increases if it is a massive strike by several drones on a single point or if significantly faster jet UAVs are used.
However, everything changes when the drone flies and attacks a target in controlled mode and does so in daylight. Then even a single "Shahed" can find an undefended target and hit it.
"When 'Shaheds' are launched at night, they fly exclusively by coordinates," military analyst Mykhailo Zhirokhov told the BBC Ukrainian Service. "But if an operator sees, for example, a diesel locomotive during the day, he will more likely be able to hit and destroy it more effectively."
For this purpose, a Russian drone can specifically fly for a long time along railway tracks, searching for a target. If the operator does not find the desired target and the flight resource is running out, he can direct the "Shahed" to another moving or stationary object – for example, a bus or a nearby administrative building.
According to Zhirokhov, all this is aimed at achieving the maximum possible effect in a specific situation with minimal means – that is, with one attack UAV.
As for mesh systems, the Russian army began using this technology quite actively in early 2025 for online control of its attack and reconnaissance drones. The Ukrainian Armed Forces also use it.
Advisor to the Minister of Defense Serhiy Beskrestnov ("Flash") demonstrates a mesh modem removed from a Russian "Shahed". The device shows the frequency range in which it operates, namely 3200-3400 MHz. Photo: Serhiy Flash
Indeed, at the end of last year, there was a surge in the use of "Starlink" satellite communication terminals for such UAVs, but after Ukraine and SpaceX completely cut off this possibility for Russia, it returned to mesh systems.
What is it?
This is a technology from the civilian sphere, designed to provide stable and uninterrupted Wi-Fi connection in large premises. The main aspect was that several signal receivers in different parts of the room would form a continuous signal coverage network between themselves. That is, each node was both a receiver and a repeater, which allowed signals to be transmitted over long distances without quality loss.
The Russians implemented the same in the military sphere with drones.
On "Shaheds," as well as other long-range drones, they installed special Chinese modems that not only received a radio signal but also transmitted it further to neighboring modems. Thus, an operator hundreds of kilometers from the target could control the "Shahed" in online mode, receiving a stable connection and video signal.
This looks like this: a group of UAVs, approximately 10-15 units, creates a network between themselves in flight, each element of which works as a transmitter, receiver, and repeater, which, in turn, allows tasks to be performed even if one of the drones is suppressed or shot down, because the signal then comes from a neighboring one.
Russia actively uses attack UAVs for attacks on Ukrainian railways. Pictured are the consequences of a strike on a suburban train in Sumy region on March 14. Photo: State Emergency Service of Ukraine
At the same time, distance practically plays no significant role here, since the first group of drones receives a signal from the next and so on. Cases have been recorded where "Shaheds" on online control flew in this way all the way to the western regions of Ukraine.
However, there are significant nuances.
The signal for such networks must be generated by special stations, usually installed on ordinary mobile communication masts.
To ensure the radio signal is stable and powerful enough, Russia places these stations near the Ukrainian border and in occupied territories. Ukrainian authorities have stated that they detected several such stations on the territory of Belarus.
In particular, the signal from them allowed Russia to use drones under online control for flights near Kyiv.
In late February, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov informed the media that a mesh network of such stations on Belarusian territory had been destroyed.
After this statement, no massive UAV attacks on Kyiv were recorded, but Russian "Shaheds" continued to reach the western and northwestern regions of Ukraine in individual cases.
Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for the Ukrainian Air Force, stated on April 7 on the national telethon that Russia continues to use the territory of Belarus, as well as Moldova, Transnistria, and Romania, for laying the routes of its "Shaheds". This allows the Russians to bypass potential engagement zones for their drones and fly directly into the rear areas of Ukraine.
The fact is that about 50% of "Shaheds" are shot down precisely in the frontline zone and near the eastern border. This is where most air defense forces and assets are located.
Therefore, if a drone has overcome or bypassed this strip, it can then almost unimpededly proceed to the rear areas. If it was not a conventional UAV, but a drone with a radio signal receiver-repeater, its operator will be able to select a target during the attack in online mode.
How to Counter This?
Installing special signal repeaters on "Shaheds" improves their controllability but makes production significantly more expensive. One such modem can cost up to 8 thousand dollars. This is despite the fact that a conventional "Shahed", according to approximate data, currently costs between 30 and 50 thousand dollars in total.
In fact, this is one of the reasons why such an experiment did not become widespread in the Russian army.
Another reason is that the radio signal in a UAV mesh network is quite easy to detect and jam with Ukrainian EW means.
Modern means allow for fairly quick triangulation of the signal source and its suppression, one of the heads of an EW equipment manufacturing company told the BBC Ukrainian Service.
"We are quite successfully combating mesh networks. The main thing is to detect such drones in the sky in time," he noted.
According to Serhiy Beskrestnov (call sign "Flash"), advisor to the Minister of Defense, mesh modems on "Shaheds" are suppressed by EW means at a distance of 200-500 meters.
To avoid this, the Russians try to change signal frequencies and attack routes.
Ukrainian specialists, in turn, are working to maximize the radio monitoring zone and detect groups of such radio-controlled "Shaheds" in advance.
However, creating continuous radar coverage of the territory, especially in the rear, western regions, is quite difficult.
Ukraine is only just beginning to implement the so-called "anti-drone dome" system, which would address this issue.
Aviation expert Valeriy Romanenko says that the "bottleneck" here is not the means of destruction, but precisely the location devices and effective target distribution.
"We have quite a lot of means of destruction. The 'anti-drone dome' is a system that will allow detecting 'Shaheds', monitoring their flight, and at the same time performing automatic target distribution," he explains.
Photo of the latest "Shahed" modification called "Geran-5". This is a turbojet UAV with a 90 kg warhead and a Chinese mesh modem. Ukrainian intelligence says that Russia first used it in January 2026. Photo: Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine
"If we set up an anti-drone system, the shoot-down rate should consistently be at the level of 95%, and only then will the Russians be forced to abandon this type of weapon, because the level of damage it inflicts will be less than the cost of creating this UAV."
Pavlo Yelizarov, Deputy Commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, who is precisely responsible for building the "anti-drone dome," stated in early March that this system has been developed and the Ukrainian army is already "moving towards" its implementation.
He also noted that simply increasing air defense crews would not solve the "Shahed" problem. This is due to the fact that the Russians are increasing the number of attack UAVs during attack waves, and this allows some of them to break through even three lines of Ukrainian air defense.
"They are now flying in certain 'swarms'. They no longer fly in small groups... It's like wild boars running through a forest, tearing everything down in their path. This is the model now, and it will continue to intensify, because it's their tactics of application, it's logical."
Yelizarov expressed hope that the problem of Russian "Shaheds" will be resolved in the "foreseeable future."
As for jet UAVs, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on April 8 that he had instructed Ukrainian arms manufacturers to "find a technological solution" to combat them. One obvious way is to create jet interceptor drones and improve the automatic target guidance system.