Ilarionov: Putin Will Make Concessions When the Russian Army's Advance Stops

On November 10-11, negotiations took place in Abu Dhabi between representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the USA. According to the head of the Russian delegation, Vladimir Medinsky, the central topic was the post-war security system. The parties also agreed on a prisoner exchange.

These negotiations became the occasion for a conversation between Ukrainian journalist Lyudmila Nemira and Russian economist, former Putin advisor Andrey Ilarionov, about what could force Putin to make concessions.

To Deprive the War of Meaning in Putin's Logic

Ilarionov disagreed with the journalist's proposed explanation that a "balance" on the front, where neither side can achieve significant success, becomes a prerequisite for negotiations. In his reasoning, what matters decisively is whether Ukraine is capable of depriving Russia of new territorial gains.

According to Ilarionov, the possibility of real concessions from the Kremlin depends on whether the Ukrainian army can stop the Russian advance. He explains how this could influence Putin's calculations:

"It is precisely the Ukrainian side's preventing any opportunity for him to gain even a single territory that destroys the very concept of the war – both for himself and in his attempts to sell this war to Russian society, the Russian army, and his potential allies outside Russia."

At the same time, Ilarionov distinguishes between the conditions for initiating concessions and the final cessation of aggression. He links the latter with the military defeat of the aggressor. But, according to him, the Kremlin's position can be influenced earlier.

"If the Armed Forces of Ukraine stop the advance of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine – not yet defeating them, not yet inflicting a rout, not yet expelling them from the territory of Ukraine, but stopping the advance," – this is how he forms this intermediate step.

Павялічыць

From Exhaustion to "No Step Back"

Ilarionov contrasts two strategic approaches. The first is the exhaustion of the enemy. In Ilarionov's understanding, the Ukrainian side relied on such a calculation in the first years of the full-scale war: inflicting losses on the Russian army faster than it could replenish them.

"The most important resource, the most scarce resource that the aggressor has, is manpower. And thus, by destroying manpower at a rate that exceeds the rate of its replenishment, one can bring the aggressor to a situation where he simply physically will not have enough armed forces to continue the aggression," he describes this logic.

Another approach, which he insists on, is holding territory. Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka, according to Ilarionov, must become an insurmountable frontier for the Russian army. He compares their possible role to Stalingrad and Verdun, calling this strategy "no step back."

Ilarionov admits that this could also influence war supporters in Russia. He does not expect sudden support for Ukraine from them. The possible change in mood he describes is more pragmatic: if further conquest fails, one should be limited to what has already been captured.

"Putin Has a Different Map in His Head"

At the same time, Ilarionov doubts that a ceasefire agreement itself is capable of restraining Putin for long. He sees the reason in the concept of "historical Russia," by which the Russian leader justifies territorial claims.

"In Putin's head, there isn't a geographical map that we are all used to dealing with: a geographical map of Russia, Ukraine, Europe, or other countries. [...] He has a different map in his head. Or, at least, he wants to impose on others – society, the world – his own map, his own idea of historical Russia," Ilarionov suggests.

From this, he infers the risk of new demands already after an agreement is reached. In his interpretation, Putin might again declare another part of Ukraine a "historical territory" of Russia, regardless of previous agreements.

How a Truce Can Weaken Ukraine

Ilarionov sees the main danger of a pause in hostilities in the gradual weakening of Ukrainian defense. He assumes that partners will begin to reduce support, as they will no longer see the need for previous vigilance. Meanwhile, Ukraine will have to address the issue of demobilization.

"It will be forced, sooner or later, to carry out demobilization. It will be forced to withdraw some Ukrainian troops from the front line. Some will leave to engage in peaceful activities, some will go to Europe to their families," he says.

In the scenario he describes, Russia awaits a convenient moment for a renewed attack: territorial claims remain, while Ukraine's ability to defend itself diminishes.

"If these fortified positions are not occupied by Ukrainian troops, Putin makes a new push and gains this, that, and the other," Ilarionov warns.

This is a possible scenario in his reasoning, not an established plan of the Russian leadership. Through it, Ilarionov explains why he does not consider a ceasefire alone a sufficient guarantee of security.

What Promises Putin Wants from Europe

In this context, Ilarionov examines Moscow's demands for a new European security system. He considers one of the Kremlin's goals to be the desire to preemptively exclude the presence of European troops in Ukraine.

"Putin wants to secure promises, sworn promises from European countries, that they will never, under any circumstances, deploy their troops on Ukrainian territory," he suggests.

Ilarionov explains the caution of European governments by their normal and understandable desire to avoid the spread of war by all means – this is an instinctive desire of any peaceful state. But Ilarionov does not consider the current position of Europeans unchangeable: what was previously rejected as unacceptable eventually becomes a subject of discussion.

"Time passes, circumstances change, conditions change. [...] One can imagine a situation in which the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of France would say: "Under these conditions, we are obliged, not just able, we are obliged to deploy our troops on the territory of Ukraine," Ilarionov admits.

• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0