Despite sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine, Japan has become one of the main channels for the supply of high-tech components used in Russian weapons. An investigation by The New York Times reveals how, according to Western intelligence agencies, Russian intelligence was able to organize the procurement and export of necessary technologies in the country.
After the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, the West tried to block Russia's access to technologies necessary for the production of modern weapons. Hundreds of Russian spies were expelled from European capitals, and sanctions were imposed against Kremlin-linked companies.
But, as The New York Times investigation shows, one of the new centers of Russian intelligence activity has become Japan. It is from there, the publication claims, that Moscow continues to receive high-tech components for its defense industry.
The scale of the problem, according to NYT, is also confirmed by the results of Ukrainian expert analyses. After a Russian Kh-101 cruise missile destroyed a residential high-rise building in Kyiv in May, killing at least 24 people, specialists examined its wreckage. Ukrainian expert analysis found that Japanese components, whose export to Russia was banned after the imposition of sanctions, were used in the missile's guidance system.
The New York Times investigation is based on confidential government documents, corporate materials, and dozens of interviews with current and former intelligence and government officials from three continents. Most interlocutors agreed to speak only on condition of anonymity, as they were not authorized to disclose intelligence information.
Secret GRU unit and "Aeroflot"
According to the publication, a little-known 20th Directorate of Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) plays a key role in this scheme. Citing employees of five Western intelligence agencies, NYT states that its employees, under the guise of diplomats or representatives of commercial companies, are engaged in searching for, purchasing, and illegally exporting high-tech goods necessary for weapons production to Russia.
The head of this activity in Japan, as NYT sources claim, is GRU officer Maxim Filchenkov. In February 2024, the 49-year-old man was appointed head of Aeroflot's representative office in Tokyo. According to Western intelligence agencies, under the cover of this position, Filchenkov coordinates the procurement of high-tech components for Russia.
Although Aeroflot is not under Japanese sanctions, its activities in the country have effectively ceased, as the airline cannot receive necessary spare parts and technical maintenance. However, its official partners continue to operate.
One of them, according to the investigation, is the Japanese logistics company Proco Air. It organizes the transportation of goods to countries where Aeroflot flies, such as Sri Lanka or Uzbekistan. From there, the Russian airline picks them up and delivers them to Russia. This mechanism itself does not violate the law, as many categories of goods are still allowed to be exported.
However, Western intelligence agencies consider such logistical chains an important element of Russian intelligence activity. According to NYT, Vietnam has become one of the main transit points for Japanese dual-use technologies sought by the Kremlin, from where they are then resold to Russia.
Proco Air owner Takehiko Miki told journalists that he met Filchenkov around 2018, but began actively cooperating with him after his return to Tokyo in 2024. Miki denies knowing about Filchenkov's ties to Russian intelligence agencies or participating in the transportation of prohibited goods. According to him, the company primarily ships medical equipment and cosmetics.
However, NYT journalists noted that one of the documents he presented indicated cooperation with the Russian pharmaceutical company "R-Pharm". Its founder, Alexei Repik, is under sanctions from the UK, Canada, and Australia for close ties with Vladimir Putin. At the same time, Proco Air itself has not been accused of violating the law in any country.
Why Japan?
According to estimates by the Ukrainian government, about 90% of Russian missiles and drones contain Japanese components. This refers to microchips, semiconductors, transmitters, and other dual-use elements that can be used in the production of modern weaponry.
At the same time, Japan has supported Ukraine since the very beginning of the full-scale war: it joined sanctions against Russia and, contrary to post-war tradition, began supplying Kyiv with military aid, including bulletproof vests and helmets.
However, according to NYT interlocutors, sanctions alone proved insufficient. One of the main reasons why Russian intelligence continues to operate in Japan is the specifics of local legislation. After World War II, the powers of Japanese intelligence agencies were significantly limited, and there is virtually no separate law on espionage in the country.
Kyiv has repeatedly informed Tokyo that components for Russian weapons continue to flow through Japan. As NYT claims, in April 2025 alone, Ukraine sent no less than eight diplomatic notes to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs with information about Japanese components found in Russian missiles and other weapons after attacks on civilian targets. There were about eight more such communications throughout the year. They were accompanied by lists and photographs of printed circuit boards, semiconductors, transmitters, and other Japanese-made components.
The documents mentioned products from companies such as NEC, Panasonic, Toshiba, and others. However, the Ukrainian side did not claim that these companies knowingly supplied products to Russia. The manufacturers themselves told NYT that they comply with sanction requirements and did not violate legislation.
Japanese authorities recognize the scale of the problem and are already taking measures. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has warned companies and industry associations about attempts to circumvent sanctions and has blacklisted dozens of foreign entities suspected of assisting Russia.
At the same time, the country began to strengthen the capabilities of its intelligence agencies to combat illegal exports and the activities of foreign intelligence services. In January, Tokyo police reported that they had identified a Russian intelligence officer posing as a Ukrainian, who tried to obtain commercial secrets from a Japanese worker. However, due to the lack of a separate espionage law, the case was opened under competition protection legislation, and the Russian agent had already left the country by that time.
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