"Instead of saving Europe, the centrists are leading it into the abyss."

He argues that defeating the far right is possible, but for that, the leaders of France, Germany, and the UK need to stop digging their own graves.

Mistakes of Political Giants

Broder points out that the leaders in Paris, Berlin, and London are firmly convinced that stopping the far right is their main mission. But they are failing at it.

The author recalls that Emmanuel Macron planned to turn France into a "startup nation" through economic reforms. Macron asked the French to be patient for future benefits. He hoped that even unpopular measures—tax breaks for the rich, raising the retirement age, harsh suppression of protests—would eventually be justified by increased prosperity, and people would support him on their own.

However, as Broder notes, instead of gratitude, Macron received a loss of majority in parliament and political paralysis. In two years, France has changed five prime ministers, while Marine Le Pen's positions have only strengthened.

The situation is no better in the UK. If Macron, according to Broder, is too harsh from a position of weakness, then Keir Starmer is too cautious from a position of strength. Despite the huge majority that the Labour Party won in the elections, the government, as the author notes, behaves "with surprising timidity." Their formula—cut spending today and hope for growth tomorrow—does not inspire voters.

Broder emphasizes that the Prime Minister has failed to effectively counter the narrative of Nigel Farage and his right-wing populist party, Reform U.K. As a result, support for Labour has fallen to 18%, while Reform U.K. has reached 30%.

In Germany, the situation also looks complicated. Friedrich Merz, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union, has bet on remilitarization not only to defend against Russia, but also as a way to revive industry. However, as the author notes, this strategy has not weakened "Alternative for Germany" (AfD).

Павялічыць

This far-right party also advocates for expanding the military industry and troops, only under German rather than European leadership, criticizes the European "green re-industrialization," but willingly promises jobs in the arms sector.

Merz hopes that the government's success will reduce the attractiveness of the far right, but they are becoming the main opposition and regularly lead in polls. And the fact that AfD is able to intercept his flagship idea of "a great Germany through militarization" should, as the author believes, alarm the Chancellor.

Broder writes: although France, Britain, and Germany are different, the governments of these countries have taken a common step—adopting their opponents' hostility towards migration.

Macron, Starmer, and Merz have tightened approaches to migration. But, as the author notes, this does not work: voters dissatisfied with immigration prefer the original, not a centrist copy.

Successful Alternatives: Denmark and Spain

Broder gives examples of countries where it has been possible to restrain the far right.

In Denmark, the Danish People's Party has lost most of its support over a decade (from 27% in 2014 to 6% in 2024). It is believed that Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen's success is due to her tough anti-immigration policy.

But the columnist believes that Frederiksen's real secret to success lay in an ambitious "green" re-industrialization program. The government convinced citizens that the transition to a green economy is a path to prosperity, backing up words with investments. Today, Danes are more concerned about climate and healthcare than migration.

Павялічыць

Even more telling, the author believes, is the example of Spain under the leadership of Pedro Sánchez. He managed to retain power and stop the growth of the far-right Vox party by pursuing policies in the interests of workers: during the pandemic, the government limited energy prices, recognized delivery couriers as wage workers with rights, and restored certain labor guarantees. Then he sharply increased the minimum wage and taxes on large fortunes.

By giving his electorate reasons to stick with him, Sánchez's party reversed the trend when low-income and less educated voters turned away from the left.

Although both Frederiksen and Sánchez are now facing difficulties, their experience proves the value of political courage. Broder is confident that economic justice and a clear project for the future work better than simply intimidating with the threat of the far right.

What's Next?

Broder offers specific solutions for current leaders. In France, he believes, there is a need for a wealth tax, stabilization of the government, and replenishment of the budget. In Britain, the government could raise living standards by curbing gas bills, taxing energy giants, and returning "green" investments. In Germany, investment restrictions could be eased to upgrade infrastructure—railways, housing—and provide another, non-military form of economic stimulus.

What will happen if centrists do not change course? The author paints a grim picture of Europe in 2030.

Broder warns: if the trend continues, by the end of the decade, the governments of Europe's largest countries may be headed by figures such as Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France, and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands.

If this happens, they will inherit states with new and dangerous powers. The build-up of armed forces on the continent, as countries increase military spending and remobilize young people into the army, is a prime example. As are the repressive measures taken by governments to suppress dissent and protests, especially on issues of war and peace.

According to the author, a "far-right European Union" will not seek to leave the EU, but will try to transform it from within. The Green Deal will be rolled back, and investments will go to militarization and deportations. Broder predicts the possibility of harsh "remigration" programs targeting Muslims and minorities, as well as suspicion of Ukrainian refugees. And the responsibility for this will lie with the current centrist leaders if they do not urgently change their strategy.

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