Denis "Redis" Prokopenko explained why Russia will lose the war

Denis Prokopenko. Photo: Facebook

On the eve of the full-scale invasion in 2022, Western analysts and intelligence seriously overestimated the Russian army. They assessed it primarily by quantity — a million-strong army, thousands of tanks, aircraft, and artillery systems. That is why many predicted the fall of Kyiv in a few days.

But, according to the commander of the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine "Azov," Denis "Redis" Prokopenko, such assessments ignored the main factors — morale, management culture, internal cohesion, and the army's ability to adapt to modern warfare.

Even now, many in the West continue to perceive the war exclusively as a war of attrition, where the one with more people and resources wins. Prokopenko calls this a mistake.

Two Different Systems

The general states that the war between Ukraine and Russia is not just a clash of armies, but a confrontation between two opposing systems that have formed in the post-Soviet space.

The Ukrainian system, according to him, is a networked model built on trust, which unleashes human potential. A significant part of the changes here were initiated and developed by ordinary citizens, soldiers, sergeants, and junior officers. As an example, he cites the transition of the Defense Forces of Ukraine to a corps system, which "Azov" actively promoted.

"Redis" argues that the Defense Forces of Ukraine, especially in units that grew out of the volunteer movement, cultivated a command philosophy based on the principles of decentralization and empowerment. This model is a modern interpretation of the German concept of Auftragstaktik (Mission Command), which was developed for conducting combat operations on a dynamic, non-linear battlefield.

Its essence is that the higher command defines the goal and overall plan of the operation, while local commanders decide exactly how to achieve the assigned task, based on the real situation on the battlefield. This requires a high level of trust between all levels of command and creates an environment where initiative becomes the foundation of combat effectiveness.

The unit transforms into a single organism, a "family" or a "team," where everyone feels their involvement and responsibility for accomplishing the assigned task.

Prokopenko emphasizes that this principle is not an informal practice; it is enshrined in the combat statutes, which emphasize determination, suddenness of actions, and the display of initiative to accomplish combat tasks in difficult conditions against superior enemy forces.

As an example, he mentions the actions of the Defense Forces in the Dobropolsk direction in the second half of 2025. There, Ukrainian forces effectively reinterpreted the concept of mobile defense: they used large "grey zones," mixed combat formations, ambushes, search-and-strike operations, fire raids, and pinpoint surgical counterattacks. The result was the encirclement of Russian units and hundreds of enemy prisoners.

The Russian system, according to Prokopenko, is a complete opposite. It is built as a rigid Soviet vertical, where everything is controlled from above, and the main criterion is not competence, but loyalty to the regime. Such a model, in his opinion, inevitably leads to paralysis on the modern battlefield.

This is especially evident in the weakness of junior command staff and in the behavior of senior officers who are willing to sacrifice a huge number of soldiers to carry out an order, even if it is doomed to fail from the outset.

What Makes "Azov" Special

Separately in his essay, Prokopenko analyzes the results of the activities of the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine "Azov," which marked its first anniversary. He notes that in a short time, they managed to form a corps command and staff from officers who, back in 2014–2015, fought in private and sergeant positions and went through all levels of military command.

According to him, the corps received a full complement of troops, which allowed it to conduct a full-fledged defensive operation. Problems of interaction between brigades, which previously allowed Russian troops to seek out weak points at the junctures of defense, were resolved. Training according to "Azov standards" increased the level of personnel preparation, and regular exercises for sergeants and officers improved troop command.

Prokopenko also notes that the units of the Armed Forces, National Guard, border guards, and police that were assigned to the corps have effectively become its part: they receive supplies, combat experience, and participate in joint training.

New units were created within the corps: the 8th Artillery Brigade "Harmash," the 41st Pilum Unmanned Systems Regiment, the "Tuman" unit, as well as a number of support structures. Several more regiments and a medical battalion are in the process of formation.

Prokopenko states that the corps managed to cover the tactical and operational depth of the front – reconnaissance, strikes, and mining now allow for the destruction of Russian equipment, warehouses, and logistics at a distance of up to 250 kilometers.

Separately, "Redis" talks about the development of the medical service: drone delivery of blood to the front line, evacuation of the wounded using ground robotic complexes, cooperation with leading clinics in Ukraine, and support programs for liberated prisoners.

In addition, the corps is developing its own infrastructure — training grounds, schools, laboratories, production facilities, and warehouses. Special emphasis is placed on intelligence, international cooperation, training centers, and a junior officer school. According to Prokopenko, all of this should scale the values of "Azov" and strengthen Ukraine's defense capability.

According to the general, Western partners are already studying Ukrainian combat experience and are eager to adopt it. Meanwhile, the battle for Donbas continues, and Ukrainian forces will continue to fight against the Russian army and seek the return of prisoners.

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