How will events unfold if Moscow again, as in 2022, starts striking Kyiv from Belarusian territory? Possible scenarios

Transportation of weaponry in Belarus, exercises. Photo by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP

Moscow's official discourse remains unchanged: the war to a victorious end, the goals of the operation (full control over Ukraine and a change in the balance of power in Europe) will be achieved, no matter the cost or how long it takes.

However, in reality, Russia has problems both on the front and with public support for the war. The advance of the Russian army has stopped. Losses on the front likely already exceed the influx of contract soldiers. The level of military enthusiasm has decreased; Russians are tired of the war. Russia needs a new factor to turn the tide of the conflict. Even if not to turn the tide, but simply to prevent a retreat, to maintain a war of attrition, awaiting the weakening of Ukraine and the West, Russia may need a new wave of mobilization. And to prevent a repeat of February 1917, something is needed that would raise faith in victory.

Analysts admit the possibility of Russia escalating the situation on the border with NATO countries to justify mobilization, so that they could declare: "The Fatherland is in danger." And then the question is whether Moscow will order the Belarusian army to participate in such an escalation and what that might entail.

In turn, Ukraine strongly warns about the possibility of escalation in the northern direction, from Belarus.

Last week was marked by Russia conducting nuclear exercises, during which the delivery of nuclear warheads to Belarus was practiced. After this, on May 22, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a conversation with the leaders of Germany, France, and Great Britain, during which, among other things, the Belarusian issue was discussed.

On May 24, a telephone conversation took place between Alexander Lukashenka and French President Emmanuel Macron. As AFP reported, citing a source in the Élysée Palace, Emmanuel Macron directly warned Alexander Lukashenka about the consequences of involvement in Russian aggression. This is the first known telephone contact between the politicians in more than four years.

Minsk reported that the conversation took place at the initiative of the French side.

It would seem there are no rational grounds for Lukashenka's regime to get involved on Russia's side in a war in which Moscow is hopelessly bogged down. If Lukashenka didn't get involved in 2022, when Moscow expected to capture Kyiv in 3-4 days, then what logic is there in getting involved in a matter that smells of kerosene?

The war would bring destruction and economic losses, and in the worst-case scenario, it could end in a popular uprising supported by the army.

The same rational analysis says that Ukraine does not need a second front to open. Now, militarily, Ukraine is stronger than in 2022, and the tactics of warfare have changed. Ukraine has an advantage in short-range drones and is close to parity in long-range drones. However, Ukraine is conserving its reserves.

What will happen if Moscow, as in 2022, starts striking northern Ukraine and Kyiv, in particular, from Belarusian territory? Having forced Minsk's consent or simply having presented Minsk with a fait accompli?

In 2022, Kyiv refrained from retaliatory strikes on Belarusian territory. Now, Kyiv will be guided by military expediency. Representatives of Ukraine have repeatedly threatened that retaliatory strikes, and possibly preventive strikes, if the threat becomes imminent, will be carried out this time. "'The Defense Forces of Ukraine, the Security Forces, and our special services know what the threats are and how to react — how to react fairly, without a doubt,' stated Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The head of Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, was even more blunt: "'To the Minsk gauleiter Lukashescu,' he wrote on his Facebook page. 'The first 500 targets are already penciled in. A free and very practical piece of advice: don't get in Ukraine's sight'."

The question is whether, in the event of such an exchange of strikes, Lukashenka will activate the Belarusian Armed Forces and to what extent. Could this depend on Ukraine's choice of targets for strikes?

However, all this could also be smoke without fire, which Moscow is creating to divert part of the Ukrainian forces from the main theater of military operations.

• 4
• 1
• 0
• 1
• 2
• 0
• 2
• 0