The West's New Headache: The Alliance of Al-Qaeda and Houthis

The Gulf of Aden is one of the key maritime corridors between the Middle East, Africa, and global markets. On one side lies Yemen, where Houthis control a significant part of the territory, and on the other, Somalia, where the Al-Qaeda-linked group Al-Shabaab operates. These two forces, previously religious adversaries, have now established cooperation.

An Alliance of Convenience

The rapprochement is primarily explained by mutual benefit. Al-Shabaab, which the WSJ calls Al-Qaeda's largest and most profitable offshoot, has money but seeks modern weapons and technology. The Houthis, who have received weaponry and training from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for years, can offer this. In return, they receive funding and an opportunity to establish a foothold on the African coast of the Gulf of Aden.

This is particularly important due to the region's position. Before the war with Iran, 12% of the world's seaborne oil passed through the Gulf of Aden. If Iranian forces were to largely close the Strait of Hormuz, this route could become an alternative for supplies from the Middle East. However, the Houthis have supported Tehran and are attacking Saudi-linked tankers in the Red Sea with missiles and drones.

As the author notes, not long ago, an alliance between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab seemed like something out of science fiction: the former are predominantly Shia, the latter Sunni. Now, shared animosity towards the USA and Israel has outweighed religious differences. Ties between the groups have existed since at least 2023 and have gradually evolved from arms trade into broader military cooperation.

Павялічыць

Weapons and Training

Al-Shabaab is trying to acquire, among other things, man-portable air-defense systems, 107mm Katyusha rockets, Dragunov sniper rifles, attack drones, anti-tank missiles, and American night vision devices in Yemen. It is unknown exactly what of this has already reached Somalia. However, in April 2025, the US destroyed two flagless vessels carrying modern weaponry from Yemen to Somali waters.

According to the WSJ, the shipments are disguised as ordinary trade. Front Yemeni companies register weapons as civilian goods and deliver them to ports, from where they are transported across the gulf on speedboats and fishing vessels. The cargo is unloaded on Somalia's weakly controlled northern coast and then sent to Al-Shabaab's combat units in the south of the country.

Along with weapons, the group also gains new skills. At least 100 of its fighters have already traveled to Yemen for training. The UN reported groups of about 30 people being taught shooting, anti-aircraft operations, and the creation of more lethal booby traps. This year, one group spent three months in Saada, mastering drone assembly and operation. Houthi instructors also travel to Somalia themselves.

Al-Shabaab can pay for this without significant problems. According to American intelligence, it collects at least $100 million annually — mainly through levies on Somali businesses, people at checkpoints, and in the port of Mogadishu. Another source of income has been artisanal gold mining in the Cal Madow mountains.

Struggle for the Somali Coast

For the Houthis, however, as the WSJ writes, money may not be the main goal. They are interested in a presence in Somalia that would allow them to monitor shipping on both sides of the Gulf of Aden. One idea is to deploy radars with Al-Shabaab's help to track ships.

This plan gained additional significance after Israel recognized the independence of Somaliland in December — a region that declared its secession from Somalia in 1991. It hosts the strategic port of Berbera with a very long runway, which NASA once even leased for emergency landings of space shuttles. A military presence there would give Israel a strong position against the Houthis.

The Houthis have already threatened to attack any Israeli presence in Somaliland. And in June, a four-person delegation traveled to Somalia and reached Jilib — the de facto capital of Al-Shabaab territories. According to intelligence reports, the parties discussed countering Israeli activity in Berbera, and the Houthis promised more modern weapons and training.

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Elimination of the Intermediary

One of the key intermediaries between the two groups was the 38-year-old Somali Djibril Yahya Ali, nicknamed "One-Handed." Since at least 2023, he shuttled between Somalia and Yemen, represented Al-Shabaab's interests, and helped organize arms supplies. The Houthis gave him an apartment in Sanaa and a forged Yemeni passport.

In 2024, Al-Shabaab dispatched a more senior representative, Sheikh Ahmed Elmi Samatar, to him, who handed the Houthis a list of needed armaments. After Samatar's arrest by Yemeni authorities and his subsequent exchange for Houthi prisoners, Djibril continued this work.

On February 12, Djibril was killed by a missile strike near Yemen's Al-Ghaydah: a missile pierced the roof of his Toyota Corolla and, without exploding, cut the car in half. His wife had exited the car to answer a phone call just before the strike and survived.

Two American sources confirmed to the WSJ that it was a US strike, but Central Command stated that the operation was not carried out by American military personnel, and the CIA did not comment on whether it was involved.

The elimination of the intermediary, however, did not stop the cooperation: Al-Shabaab has already appointed a replacement for him in Yemen. Meanwhile, the US is intensifying pressure on the group itself: this year, they carried out about 40 airstrikes on its targets in Somalia, compared to 41 for the entire year of 2025.

As a result, as the WSJ notes, what began as mutually beneficial trade is gradually acquiring a strategic character. Al-Shabaab gains access to more modern weapons and military technologies, and the Houthis gain money and a potential foothold in Africa. Their cooperation creates the possibility of threatening shipping from both sides of one of the world's most important maritime corridors.

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