Is Belarus Too 'Minsk-Centric'? Siarhei Naumchyk Debates Adam Hlobus

Siarhei Naumchyk. Photo: Uladz Hrydzin / Radio Svaboda

Adam Hlobus says that Minsk instantly strips provincials of their arrogance as soon as they descend into the metro, where everyone is equal. The observation is, perhaps, valid. The only problem is that the most arrogant provincials do not use the metro — just like the most arrogant "capital dwellers."

I have heard many times from residents of Vitebsk or Grodno about the arrogance of Minsk residents — and now I read in Hlobus about the arrogance of provincials.

I am convinced that human qualities do not depend on the place of residence. Just as they do not depend on one's profession or what is commonly called social status.

In my experience, there are precisely opposite examples — since my student years, I have never felt "capital pride" in Vintsuk Viachorka, Siarhei Dubavets, or Ales Susha, whose parents held high positions — and saw it in some other Minsk residents, children of "ordinary" parents. It is hard to say what influences this — character, upbringing, intellect, or something else, or all together.

Adam Hlobus speaks about the necessity of strengthening "capitalness" — but in my opinion, the problem is precisely the opposite. We see an excessive "over-capitalization," "over-Minskification" of the country.

This topic is complex; its beginning probably dates back to the 1930s, when almost the entire political, creative, and scientific elite was wiped out. It is worth recalling the mass relocation from the regions (primarily from villages) to Minsk in the 1950s-60s for the construction of industrial giants, and new capitalist relations (even if in the "market socialism" variant) also gave dynamism to the process.

Today, Minsk has concentrated virtually 100% of influence in all spheres of life.

This is an anomaly that even Lukashenka noticed (perhaps the only thing I will agree with him on). It's another matter that it is precisely part of the model of his personalistic power, and he is not interested in changes.

In democratic countries, there is no such concentration.

I understand that it is unfashionable to cite the USA as an example of democracy now, but nevertheless. Many nationwide US government agencies are located not in Washington but in other cities (this is well known to immigrants who have to apply there for various documents).

The headquarters of most leading American media outlets are not in Washington. The editorial office of the Los Angeles Times, no less authoritative than The Washington Post, is not in the capital at all, and not even in Los Angeles, but in the town of El Segundo, with a population of only 17 thousand (less than Krychaŭ; a journalism faculty joke "I will be assigned to the 'Krychaŭ Science Monitor'" — from The Christian Science Monitor — is not such a joke after all... By the way, the CSM editorial office is in Boston).

In Washington, there are no film studios comparable to those in California, no theater comparable to the Guthrie Theater in Minneapolis, and Boston universities surpass not only American but global rankings. For comparison: I know that in the 1970s-90s, only a few academics lived in the five regional centers of Belarus; in any case, in Vitebsk, only one associate member (of the academy) lived for decades — but then he also moved to Minsk.

And I'm not even mentioning what's in New York...

Political Decentralization

In the Czech Republic, the Constitutional Court is located not in the capital, but in Brno — 200 km from Prague. Driving from the capital takes two hours (that's on the highway, plus getting out of Prague traffic!).

How sensible such a decision is, is evidenced by a parallel with Belarus. As some former members of the Constitutional Court told me, in 1996, the fate of the deputies' appeal for Lukashenka's impeachment was decided literally in about an hour — within which Lukashenka's envoy walked a few hundred meters from the administration building to the Constitutional Court building, spoke with its chairman Tsikhinya, then the chairman visited the administration, and upon returning to his office, announced the cancellation of the impeachment proceedings. The location of the Constitutional Court in Vitebsk, for example, could have thwarted such an operation. I am, of course, exaggerating, but the meaning, I believe, is clear.

A certain "decentralization," at least in the political sphere, began in our country in the early 90s. If previously in the BSSR, "republican" scale politicians were considered those who headed the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers (and accordingly lived in Minsk), then the first relatively democratic elections literally within a few months made Halina Siamdzianava from Navahrudak, Liavon Barshcheuski from Navapolatsk, Ales Shut from Lahoisk, Mikalai Kryzhanouski from Zhodzina, politicians of national scale (and indeed — Aliaksandr Lukashenka from Shklov). The destruction of parliamentarism once again "centralized" political life, and in this sense, the nomination of Aliaksandr Milinkevich from Hrodna was an attempt to break the "Minsk-centricity."

Without the 'Russian World'

If we look deeper, the problem is not in the plane of opposing "capital — province," but in the confrontation of "Belarusianness — Russian world."

For example, it is usually considered desirable for an actor or singer to move to the capital (because it has the best theaters, the largest concert venues are usually in the capital, plus film studios, etc.). Both Minsk, Tallinn, and Moscow are capitals. But for an Estonian singer, moving to Moscow is nonsense; the question doesn't even arise. For a significant number of Minsk actors, especially the younger generation, "conquering Moscow" is a dream. There are many reasons for this, but ultimately, it all boils down to the level of national consciousness. A Tallinn resident will first and foremost buy a book in Estonian and go to a concert by an Estonian singer.

This, again, did not begin today; it was formed over decades and was combined with the same draining into Minsk. The village as a bearer of the Belarusian language was disappearing, and the main condition for the adaptation of new capital residents was the mandatory abandonment of their native language. If not they themselves, then their children completely switched to the "correct language." This applied to all spheres without exception, including artists and even writers (in this sense, Adam Hlobus himself is a fortunate exception to an unpleasant tradition).

Unfortunately, in the 35th year of independence, Minsk still remains, for a significant part of its residents, largely a provincial city, on the periphery of the Russian cultural, educational, scientific field (not to mention the political, economic, and military aspects). The situation has been significantly worsened by the forced emigration of a large number of creative (and not only creative) intelligentsia.

New 'Aristocrats'

Adam Hlobus talks about "aristocracy," linking it to "capitalness" (at least, that's how I understood it). I don't know what he means by the concept of aristocracy — in the classical sense, aristocracy in Belarus was destroyed many decades ago; there is no class division.

But if it were to appear now... "Duchess Kachanava," "Baron Hihin," "Count de Karpenkov" — how do you like that?

In fact, it's no laughing matter. A new aristocracy (with an amendment for modern realities, of course) has already been practically formed, and these are by no means those who are traditionally included in the national elite.

Dozens and dozens of families close to Lukashenka have assets worth tens, or even hundreds, of millions of dollars each. Most of them, of course, are concentrated in Minsk. Their descendants, for generations, if they wish, may no longer work and still remain in the upper stratum of society (which, in fact, happens with aristocracy in its traditional classical sense).

And let's not delude ourselves: even with a democratic change of power, the main part of this "new capital aristocracy" will retain their capital and property. Not all, of course, but — most of them.

And this includes political influence through media ownership, lobbying, and other mechanisms that operate entirely legally even in countries with stable democracies and the rule of law.

And the problem is not that these will be Lukashenka's former associates or, if you will, collaborators with the regime. They are already apologists for the 'Russian world,' and at best they will transform into 'We cannot survive without Russia!' and 'We have two state languages!' Their financial capabilities will for a long time be disproportionately greater than the assets of nationally oriented businesses (which will still have to get on its feet).

The influence of this clearly pro-Russian "aristocracy" will be felt for decades. And, I repeat, through democratic mechanisms.

About 'Palesian Autonomy'

Nasha Niva also published Adam Hlobus's statements about the idea of the so-called Palesian autonomy, popular in the late 80s.

The topic requires serious analysis, but I will limit myself to a brief retrospection.

The idea of "Palesian distinctiveness," which emerged in the late 80s within the Belarusian democratic movement (some of its adherents contributed to the formation of "Martyrology" and the BPF), quite quickly transformed into a current hostile to Belarusian independence.

More precisely — it was actively helped to transform. A structure was formed that joined the "People's Movement of Belarus" (NDB), created as an alternative to the BPF, led by Council of Ministers employee Siarhei Haidukevich (the same one who would later head the local "Zhirinovskyites," and then be Lukashenka's spoiler in "elections").

The NDB aimed to incorporate Belarus into Russia; in 1993, it created the illusion of "popular support" for the idea of Belarus joining the CSTO system, controlled by the Russian General Staff. I remind you that in the spring of 1993, it was Deputy Lukashenka who "pushed" the issue of the CSTO onto the agenda of the Supreme Soviet session, which, I am convinced, drew the attention of certain structures in Moscow (or perhaps interested them even earlier, and at the session, he was already capitalizing on that attention).

As one of the leaders of the "Palesian autonomy" idea then stated to me, who refused to speak Belarusian with me (although he knew the language well), "Мы вам устроим события почище Карабаха" (We will arrange events for you worse than Karabakh).

Well, it didn't work out.

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