What's it like to live between Trump and Putin? A historian on the new world order and forecasts for 2026

Photo: "Suspilne"

Who Writes the History of Wars

— Where did the idea that winners write history come from? And is it really so?

— Preparing for the interview, I asked ChatGPT where this idea came from. The chat somewhat hesitated. Sometimes this expression is attributed to Churchill, but in fact, he said something different: "History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it myself."

The most obvious example of winners writing history is the world shaped by the history of World War II. The victors indeed control the narrative, including at the legislative level. Moreover, I believe that such an assessment of Nazism is absolutely correct.

But this does not mean that the winners are the only ones who write history. Otherwise, there would be no memoirs of German commanders from Hitler's time or the memoirs of German journalist Marta Hillers, "A Woman in Berlin," which document events during the fall of the city. So, even in this case, the definition that only winners write history is incorrect.

Let me give an example of Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War was actually described by a man who fought on the side of those who lost. And today we have the world's most famous history of war, written by effectively the defeated.

Winners control the narrative only for a certain period of time. But if there is an alternative version, it may eventually prove more influential.

— With the grand narrative of World War II, everything is more or less clear. But what happens with the history of wars that do not end with the capitulation of one of the sides?

— I think that from a historical perspective, there is a war for who will control the narrative. First and foremost, in the territory of Ukraine. Today, in the occupied Ukrainian territories, we see the introduction of Russian textbooks, confiscation, burning, or destruction of Ukrainian books. This means the transformation of Ukrainians into Russians not only in a political but also in a cultural sense.

Another battlefield is the perception of this war outside Russia and Ukraine.

Today, in the Western world, the dominant narrative is that Russia's aggression is a violation of international law and an unprovoked attack on another state. But there is also another parallel narrative: that NATO and the West provoke Russia and are responsible for it. It finds support among both the left, who traditionally view the USA as an imperialist state, and the right, who believe that isolationism should be defining. Not to mention the countries of the Global South, where anti-imperialism is understood exclusively as anti-Western ideology.

Much will depend on how the war ends in the historically short term. The world will further have to deal with whoever can convince themselves and others that they have won.

— You confidently use the words "victory," "defeat." In fact, today, with active hostilities, few are able to define the parameters of victory for Ukraine. Your perspective on this is interesting.

— We don't know how the war will end. But looking at what is happening today, I think that after the cessation of active hostilities, both Ukraine and Russia will declare their victory.

I am also convinced that sooner or later, on both sides, the search for enemies among their own will intensify: who surrendered Crimea, who allowed the destruction of the cruiser "Moskva," strikes on Moscow, complete Western isolation, and the freezing of Russian assets. This search for culprits will continue and intensify.

I think that even with the loss of territories, the preservation of statehood is a historical victory for Ukraine.

For Russia, this is a much more complex topic. I believe that in the medium term, they will evaluate this war as a loss. But evaluations will change depending on Russia's own political cycles. Historically, it is not a democratic country. The only possibility for correcting the course and, accordingly, the narratives is the death of a leader and some interregnum thereafter, as happened with Khrushchev's "Thaw."

If Russia emerges victorious in this war in its own eyes and the eyes of the world, then, of course, imperial tendencies in writing and rewriting history will be strengthened. The entire history of this country speaks to this.

Trump and the New Old World Order

— Today, one increasingly hears about the death of the "collective West" and the formation of a new world order in Trump's name. Two questions: is it really new, and is it truly a world order, not world chaos?

— Here there are some forgotten, yet traditional moves, and there is a new factor.

From what existed—this is, so to speak, a return to the realities of the Cold War. The world is again beginning to divide into clearly defined spheres of influence. Within these spheres, great powers essentially have carte blanche to establish order as they see fit. Remember: the Soviet Union sends troops into Hungary, Czechoslovakia—the West protests, but it doesn't change reality. On the other hand, the USA and Britain in 1953 staged a coup in Iran, supported dictatorial regimes in Latin America and Asia to prevent communism from entering.

Clashes between two global centers of influence occur in "grey zones" or where bottom-up revolutions happen. Ukraine in this context is precisely the junction between the Western sphere of influence and the structures Russia is creating around itself.

The year 2025 posed a question mark: are we moving towards a bipolar world (USA and China), or towards multipolarity, where the USA plays a separate role from Europe. This is the new factor—a split in the Western camp. It's new not only in America's attempt to return to isolationism.

What's new is that America, in the person of Trump, is posing a political and ideological challenge to Europe and putting forth territorial claims against one of the European countries. This is extremely threatening to Western unity.

— It seems that the strategy of many politicians in Europe is to survive Trump's presidency as a natural disaster. Has Trump really initiated irreversible changes?

— Trump would not have been elected president if his rhetoric hadn't met the demands of American society. These demands coincide with trends in Europe: Brexit, a wave of populism, the rise in popularity of the far-right. This is the world's reaction to the great liberal shift after 1991, to globalization, and unprecedented waves of emigration.

This means that Trump isn't changing the world; Trump emerged because the world changed. The world gives birth to Trump, and Trump, as the most prominent politician in this direction, continues to change the world by saying things that have been taboo for decades.

If we return to the topic of war: Putin is primarily a challenge for Ukraine, Trump is a challenge for Europe. Today, Europe and Ukraine find themselves in the same boat.

— What must Ukraine do to stay in this boat?

— The first task is to survive. It's also important to demonstrate to Europe what Ukraine can offer it. And this, unfortunately, is the experience of war. Europe today has the only combat-ready army—the Ukrainian one. It becomes clear that NATO is not ready to respond at the level Ukraine is responding. Europe currently cannot defend itself; it is forced to help Ukraine do so.

Security Guarantees and Elections

— Are there historical examples of effective security guarantees?

— Absolute guarantees do not exist. They are only as strong as their fulfillment aligns with the national interests of the guarantor countries and as much as the aggressor believes in their reality.

If Europe decides that it is better to fight Russia on Ukrainian territory than on Polish or German territory, such guarantees could become a reality. From the US side, this is unlikely: any American government will avoid direct confrontation with nuclear Russia.

What 2026 Will Bring

— What will 2026 bring to the world and Ukraine?

— It is clear that the Russian-Ukrainian war has ended the period of the "end of history." Much will depend on whether the Congressional elections adjust the isolationist position of the US (the chances for this are 60 to 40%). It is also important whether the strengthening of Europe's sovereignty (or "sovereignization") intensifies.

But most of all, it depends on where the war in Ukraine goes. The worst would be a Russian breakthrough that would undermine the stability of the front and society. It is evident that the war has dragged on, and exhaustion is felt in both Ukraine and Russia.

— What events this year would surprise you?

— After Budanov's appointment to the President's Office or the capture of Maduro, I don't know if anything could strongly surprise me. But if we talk about hopes—the biggest surprise I would like to receive would be a change of regime in Russia.

• 1
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0
• 0