"I haven't met a single soldier who doesn't respect Drapati": a new generation commander leads the AFU. Who is Mykhailo Drapati?

"I think it will clearly be better than before. Well, or at least better than it could have been. I haven't met a single soldier who doesn't respect Drapati. With Syrsky, it's the exact opposite," an acquaintance fighting in the Air Assault Forces replied to Timur on the evening of July 21.

"And he's not the only one who thinks so. Judging by the channels of servicemen (who were in the army before 2022), they have long wanted Drapati. Drapati has ideals. In this, he is close to people like Biletsky, Redis [Prokopenko], Fedorov, Flash [Beskresnov]," says Timur.

Here's what Timur also explained to us.

Rallies during the war

For the first time since the protests surrounding NABU and SAP, Ukrainian cities once again saw mass rallies — and not against the occupier, but due to an internal political decision by the authorities. Formally, the country lives under martial law, which restricts mass actions by law. But for almost a week now, people have been coming out to the squares — and no one is dispersing them. For a country at war, this is a rare and eloquent picture, and it is with this that one should begin to understand the scale of events.

It all began with Volodymyr Zelensky's dismissal of Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov. The decision caused widespread resonance primarily because it was not accompanied by any public communication: society was not explained why this happened. The underlying cause — a systemic conflict between the minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, Oleksandr Syrsky — became known later, largely thanks to journalists.

According to The Economist, Fedorov sought Syrsky's removal from office, and an audit conducted by the ministry allegedly uncovered billions in overspending in the defense department.

On July 16, Fedorov came out to journalists and effectively brought the hidden confrontation into the open. He confirmed the conflict, stated that Syrsky had issued ultimatums to him and blocked ministry initiatives — and at the same time acknowledged that the Commander-in-Chief "saved the country" during the defense of Kyiv in 2022. Along with the minister, his media advisors — Serhiy Sternenko and Serhiy Beskresnov ("Flash") — also resigned.

It was this statement that provoked the public's reaction. Already on July 17, tens of thousands of people gathered in Kyiv to support Fedorov, and protests swept across more than a dozen cities.

The organizer was Dmytro Kozyatinsky, a veteran of the Russian-Ukrainian war, who accused Syrsky of "engaging in politics instead of the front," demoralizing the army, and sabotaging reforms.

It is noteworthy that initially the rallies were depersonalized. People came out not "for a specific minister" — Fedorov himself said this — but for an idea: for reforms, technologies, for a different quality of warfare. And only later did the protest focus on a slogan that began to be chanted in squares from Kyiv to Ivano-Frankivsk: "Fedorov - minister, Drapati - Commander-in-Chief."

Zelensky's managerial dilemma

The decision was difficult, it must be admitted. When two key people cannot work together, and the common cause depends on their cooperation, the classic managerial solution is to dismiss one. And here was a dilemma: a civilian minister responsible for logistics, procurement, and promotion of technological projects — or a Commander-in-Chief with a formed military strategy, whose replacement would mean breaking that strategy and a long adaptation.

The cost of time is now extremely high. Many believe that Ukraine has an window of opportunity — to seize the initiative before the parliamentary elections in Russia, which will be held on September 18-20. The Ukrainian leadership publicly does not rule out that immediately after the elections, Moscow may announce a new wave of mobilization, which it had postponed until now. In other words, the clock is ticking.

The casting lasted only a few days

Next, the president demonstratively met with military personnel — among them were Mykhailo Drapati, Apostol, Horbatiuk, Biletsky, Obolensky, Prokopenko. This was a "casting" for the new Commander-in-Chief: either Drapati, or Apostol as a compromise figure close to Syrsky.

Drapati, by the way, publicly supported Fedorov, saying that the ex-minister often had to implement many decisions despite the system, not because of it.

Павялічыць

During this process, the country received a column from Syrsky himself — "My work is war." And here it is important to be precise: Syrsky rejects the conflict. He delineates responsibility — the ministry is responsible for provision, procurement, and civilian control, while strategy and planning of operations, according to the law, fall on him. He called the public demand to "present the strategy" a demand to present it to the enemy. And he specifically emphasized that he would cooperate with any minister appointed by the state.

The arguments of the former Commander-in-Chief were not unfounded. The problem is rather that the column did not answer the sensitive questions posed by both society and part of the military. And there are many questions. Syrsky is valued as a tough crisis manager, capable of "resolving" the most complex situations — but he is criticized for micromanagement and a tendency to solve problems by quantity rather than quality. His approach leads commanders to lie in their reports. It is this reproach — "a small Soviet army will not defeat a large Soviet army" — that is the nerve of the protest.

A bit of information warfare in the process

Instead of a clear answer, the country received a competition of narratives. The Command of the Logistics Forces of the AFU wrote that logistics under Fedorov had allegedly worsened. However, over six months there were no complaints about supplies from servicemen, and such problems are usually noticed quickly. The post was quickly deleted.

The most painful episode is the story of the "Skelya" regiment (425th Separate Assault Regiment) in Kostiantynivka. On July 18, the unit showed a video of its fighters raising the Ukrainian flag — on which there were images of the president and the Commander-in-Chief. The next day, Russian propaganda disseminated footage of the same servicemen allegedly captured, at the same location. The regiment itself called this a manipulation — an attempt to pass off a local episode of fighting as a failure of the entire operation; at the same time, officially, the fact of the capture of comrades-in-arms in "Skelya" was called "extremely painful news." This story is a vivid example of how a media demonstration at the front can turn into a real risk to the lives of soldiers.

Yermak's Shadow

Andriy Yermak is formally just the former head of the President's Office. The current head of the OP is Kyrylo Budanov, and Yermak himself is implicated in a corruption case regarding money laundering. But the fact that a person without a state position, after being dismissed, continues to spend time with military personnel and, apparently, retains significant influence on the most sensitive topics for the country, gives the protests new momentum.

Reports that Yermak visited Syrsky's command post and communicates with generals after Fedorov's resignation should be taken almost as fact — just not fully proven. There is no direct evidence, but indirect evidence — his frequent and close contacts with the military top brass — is already enough to speak about it openly. And it seems that it is this unsystematic influence that is leading the country into a dark zone — when decisions on the most important issues are made outside of official positions, outside of procedures, and outside of accountability.

Why is this happening now?

Most regrettably, the crisis erupted at a moment when Ukraine is having success at the front. Syrsky himself previously acknowledged that the Russian offensive had "petered out," though he cautioned: it's too early to rejoice, too early to speak of a turning point. In parallel, the isolation of Crimea continued. Strikes on the southern logistics of the "Dnipro" grouping caused fuel shortages and disruptions to electricity and water on the peninsula. And on the night of July 18, drones struck the Wildberries and Ozon logistics hubs in Kotovsk and Elektrostal.

Budanov links the increase in the intensity of strikes on Russian logistics with a breakthrough in the production of Ukrainian offensive weapons.

And this is the essence of the public demand: people want asymmetry, technologies, development, and not a "safe game" within a system that, although it works, entails a large number of losses. The logic is simple and quite harsh: if Russia announces mobilization after the September elections, Ukraine will not be able to compete with it in terms of personnel. The enemy will win by sheer numbers — and everyone understands this. Hence the readiness to take risks, to go for reform and technological advancement, even if it is risky in the moment.

Ukrainian society remains a subject

Another important aspect of this story: in a country where wartime law restricts mass actions, people still come out to the squares, ask difficult questions to the authorities — and are listened to. For neighbors observing Ukraine from the outside, this is perhaps the most important signal: even in the fifth year of a full-scale war, Ukrainian society remains a subject, not just a backdrop. And as long as this voice is heard, the country has a safeguard against the worst.

What is known about Mykhailo Drapati?

Major General Mykhailo Drapati was born on November 21, 1982, in Kamianets-Podilskyi. In 2004, he graduated from the Kharkiv Institute of Tank Forces and began service in the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade.

Drapati has been fighting against the Russians since the first days of the war, since 2014. It was then that an episode occurred that made his name known throughout the country: on May 9, 2014, his 2nd Mechanized Battalion of the 72nd Brigade (Drapati himself was then a major with the call sign "Rubin") entered Mariupol to free hostages held by Russian assault troops in the police department. When the mechanic-driver reported barricades a meter high and asked what to do, Drapati ordered to storm the obstacle — and footage of his BMP effectively flying over the Russian barricades became iconic. This video still goes viral as a symbol of Ukrainian resistance and the audacious combat with which Ukrainians break enemy resistance.

In the same year, 2014, there was another, more dramatic episode: in the summer, his unit was encircled in the Luhansk region, and Drapati took responsibility, leading 260 fighters and over 30 units of equipment out of the "Izvaryne cauldron," overcoming 160 km under fire.

Then followed a command path: commander of the 58th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade (2016-2019), commander of operational groups "Kherson," "Kharkiv," "Luhansk," and the Ground Forces of the AFU (2024-2025).

He is respected among servicemen primarily because he is a combat general "from the field," not a desk general: in March 2022, he led the "Pokrovsk" / "South" grouping, which stopped the Russian advance. A distinct trait noted in the army is his readiness to take responsibility not only for victories: on June 1, 2025, after the tragedy at the Ground Forces training ground in the Sumy region, Drapati demonstrated that he was ready to bear responsibility for mistakes: he resigned as commander of the Ground Forces.

Drapati is considered a commander who publicly defends his people and is not afraid to talk about real problems in the army.

"Service to Ukraine during the War for Independence"

"Service to Ukraine has always been an honor for me, and during the war for independence, it means absolute responsibility. I am grateful to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrsky, for his consistent work in strengthening the Ukrainian army. I grew up under him," Mykhailo Drapati stated after his appointment as the new Commander-in-Chief of the AFU.

Fedorov: We need to write new chapters and correct mistakes

"This is a new breath of air and new hope in the struggle of free people for freedom and justice. A voice for change that could not be ignored.

Now, the high expectations of Ukrainians must be justified by a clear vision for ending the War for Independence, a strong team, and decisive actions aimed at preserving the lives of our warriors, robotizing the front, delivering asymmetrical strikes, and exhausting the Russian economy.

I called General Oleksandr Syrsky and thanked him for the defense of Kyiv region, the Kharkiv operation, and other historic battles.

This is already an important part of Ukraine's history.

But we need to move even faster and write new chapters, correcting all previous mistakes.

Thanks to everyone involved!" — this is how Mykhailo Fedorov reacted to Mykhailo Drapati's appointment in his Telegram channel. The last words sounded a bit with Trumpian irony, because the main person involved is himself.

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