AFU Offensive in the Oleksandrivka Direction: What is known and what are the prospects

The first phase of the AFU operation in the Oleksandrivka direction began on January 29. At that time, Russian troops, who invaded Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in the summer of 2025, were approaching the logistically important settlement of Pokrovske (not to be confused with Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast) and its southern outskirts – the village of Oleksandrivka.

Simultaneously, the Russian army was conducting offensive actions on the flanks, attempting to seize the settlements of Velykomykhailivka and Novopavlivka further north in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and settlements in Zaporizhzhia Oblast near Huliaipole to the south.

If the Russians had succeeded in their planned objective, they could have collapsed the defense of the Ukrainian fortified area in Orikhiv and broken through to the immediate approaches to Zaporizhzhia from the east.

Павялічыць

To thwart Russia's plans, the Ukrainian military command developed and launched a counter-offensive operation in this sector. Its first part lasted from late January to April, and the second from May 5 to early August.

The operation was carried out by forces of four airborne assault brigades and two assault regiments.

What was liberated

According to the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi, during the first phase of the offensive operation, an area of 450 sq. km was liberated, and during the second phase – 490 sq. km.

In total, during the offensive, 745 sq. km were taken under control and approximately 300 sq. km in the rear of the territory were cleared of Russian infiltrated groups, according to Ukrainian authorities.

According to the statement, 26 villages were liberated: 12 in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Maliivka, Sichneve, Stepove, Kalynivske, Berezove, Novomykolaivka, Zaporizke, Zlahoda, Pryvillia, Tsahelne, Ternove, Novogeorgiivka), 10 in Donetsk Oblast (Tovste, Novokhatske, Zelenyi Hai, Zorka, Piddubne, Myrny, Oleksandrivhrad, Hrushivske, Yalta, Voskresenka), and 4 in Zaporizhzhia Oblast (Rybne, Novohryhorivka, Krasnohirske, Pryvilne).

The operation allowed the Defense Forces of Ukraine to push the enemy out of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (no settlements remained under its control, but according to the DeepState map, the Dnipropetrovsk village of Filiia is still in the "grey zone").

Павялічыць

It also removed the threat of an offensive on Zaporizhzhia along the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia highway.

Russia did not comment on the statements regarding the success of the AFU offensive in the Oleksandrivka direction. However, it is worth noting that the Russian Ministry of Defense continued to report on its "advances" in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast throughout the spring and summer.

Moreover, on July 3, the ministry announced the capture of the settlement of Oleksandrivka (which is where the name of this direction comes from). To confirm its words, the Russian Federation showed a video with one soldier unfurling a Russian flag on a street in the settlement.

Throughout June-July, the Russians also reported the capture of several other neighboring villages, namely Pysantsi, Novoskeluvate, Bahadarivka, Vilne, Khrystoforivka (formerly Komunarivka), Dobropasova, Blahodatne.

Thus, according to the Kremlin's version, they were the ones who managed to break through the Ukrainian defense in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, not the AFU pushing them out of these positions.

Foreign OSINT analysts, such as the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), reject these claims and state that Russia's claims of territorial control do not correspond to reality.

Covert Operation

For understanding, these settlements are 20-25 km from the current front line.

According to Ukrainian servicemen, the enemy does not and did not have control over these villages, but filmed propaganda videos with flags after infiltrating 1-2 soldiers into the rear of AFU positions, after which these Russian servicemen were eliminated, and no consolidation on the territory occurred.

False information about their advance was reported up the chain of command to the Russian high command, says Colonel Ruslan Maryshev, commander of the 95th Air Assault Brigade of the AFU, who is participating in this offensive.

"Many Russian commanders deceived their superior leadership, providing false information about their front line – where it actually is. Even when we were already about 20-25 km deep into the defense of Russian troops, their leadership didn't believe it and gave us maps, which we took from them, retrieved... (the maps showed) that they were 25 km in our rear," he noted in an interview with the "1+1" TV channel.

In turn, the Ukrainian command did not disclose details of the Defense Forces' advance publicly for a long time.

After the first phase of the operation in the spring, military commanders, including the commander of the Air Assault Forces, revealed only general figures on the number of settlements and the area of liberated territories.

Павялічыць

Thus, the real location of the LBS (line of combat contact) for Russian servicemen in this direction came as a surprise, says Colonel Maryshev.

As an example, he cites a situation where subordinates managed to kill the commander of a Russian motorized rifle battalion, who was inspecting positions, in close combat. He did not expect that the Ukrainian army had advanced so close to his positions.

The non-public nature of the offensive operation allowed it to achieve significant results in less than six months. Specifically, what results?

Another Push

The actual expulsion of Russian troops from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is more of a political outcome.

However, in military terms, the AFU's approach to the logistical routes used by the Russian army in the South is important.

As of August 13, Ukrainian servicemen are 3-4 km from the Velyka Novosilka-Huliaipole road and continue to press in this direction near the villages of Uspenivka and Temirivka.

This means that this route, important for the logistics of the Russian grouping, is no longer safe. This forces the Russians to seek other routes for delivering food, ammunition, and personnel, especially near Huliaipole, which they captured at the end of last year.

In addition, the AFU managed to engage in battles for the village of Komar, which stands on the bank of the Mokri Yaly River, 15 km north of Velyka Novosilka.

The Russians captured this large settlement at the end of winter 2025 and turned it into a stronghold.

Павялічыць

Military analyst of the "Information Resistance" group, Konstantin Mashovets, notes that Ukrainian forces need to overcome another few kilometers (approximately 5-6 km to the village of Vilne Pole) to approach within firing control range of Velyka Novosilka.

"In such a case, in order to achieve a significant operational effect in the entire operational zone of the Russian 'Vostok' grouping of troops... the Ukrainian command won't even need to attack/assault Velyka Novosilka itself," the expert notes.

"It is enough to simply take this entire area and the part of the Huliaipole-Velyka Novosilka road leading to the west under tight fire control (including with drones). The distance of 7.5-7.7 km allows this to be done quite effectively," he believes.

Such an advance will complicate Russian logistics in the South, which will affect the combat capability of the Russian Armed Forces units and contribute to halting their offensive on Orikhiv.

That is, to put the enemy in a critical situation, the Defense Forces of Ukraine need to continue the offensive and make another "push" of 5-10 km.

Whether the AFU will be able to achieve such an effect in the near future without transferring reserves is an open question.

It is also unknown whether the Russian command is ready to transfer additional forces to halt the enemy in this direction, which is clearly not a priority for the Kremlin at the moment.

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