Former Belarusian political prisoner co-authored a major Stanford study

The study "The Kremlin's Own Rationality: Understanding and Countering Russian Ressentiment" was prepared by the Stanford US-Russia Forum (SURF) team in cooperation with the Boris Nemtsov Academic Center at Charles University in Prague.

The group was led by 27-year-old Hleb Fitsner, who is currently studying at Charles University.

The authors explicitly emphasize that the conclusions and recommendations are their own position, and not the official position of Stanford.

Why losses don't stop the Kremlin

The main idea of the work is that the Kremlin's behavior should not be explained simply by madness or miscalculations. Behind Moscow's actions lies an internal logic, but it differs from the usual Western "cost-benefit" model.

The authors describe Moscow's logic through the concept of ressentiment. It was introduced into philosophical usage by Friedrich Nietzsche at the end of the 19th century and later developed by philosopher and sociologist Max Scheler.

In Nietzsche, ressentiment arises from a feeling of one's own weakness and inability to change the situation: resentment and envy towards the stronger gradually transform into a separate system of values, in which one's own weakness is declared a moral advantage, and the qualities of the opponent are vices. Scheler extended this idea to entire social groups and nations: according to him, ressentiment can arise where there is a painful gap between the perception of one's own status and the real situation.

In the authors' interpretation of the study, Russian ressentiment is a mixture of an inferiority complex, resentment, envy, shame, and hatred towards the West, which is simultaneously perceived as both an adversary and a model to be caught up with or surpassed. Therefore, Russia can simultaneously reject Western values and strive for recognition from the West as an equal or even superior power.

Hence the paradox: sanctions, heavy losses on the front, or economic problems may not force the Kremlin to retreat, but, on the contrary, appear to it as proof of Russia's special strength. The greater the sacrifices, the easier it is to explain to society that it is waging a "historic struggle" against the entire West. According to the authors of the study, this is precisely why concessions are also dangerous: Moscow may perceive them not as a step towards compromise, but as proof of the enemy's weakness.

The work cites figures for the scale of this cost: almost 1.4 million cumulative Russian losses killed, wounded, and missing, huge military expenditures, a budget deficit, and tens of billions of dollars that Moscow pays to circumvent sanctions.

But such a price of war cannot remain without consequences for Moscow. The authors see four main vulnerabilities: dependence on China, which the Kremlin cannot admit; the impossibility of ending the war without Ukraine's surrender and at the same time the increasing difficulty of continuing it; competition with radical Russian nationalists who demand even greater escalation; and Putin's personal interest in his own physical survival.

Don't separate Russia from China, but emphasize its dependence

This leads to one of the most unusual recommendations of the study. Washington is urged to abandon the calculation of a "reverse Kissinger" - an attempt to lure Moscow to the side of the US against Beijing.

Instead, the authors propose systematically calling Russia a dependent, junior partner of China. Not with propaganda slogans, but through intelligence reports, parliamentary hearings, official statements, research, and media - each time relying on verifiable facts. The point is to hit the most painful spot of imperial ideology: a state that started a war for recognition of its "greatness" itself increasingly depends on Beijing.

Moreover, if Moscow threatens the West with its "red lines", the authors propose to publicly respond that this issue will be discussed with Beijing - as the stronger party in the Russian-Chinese tandem.

Belarus is not a buffer, but a Russian bridgehead

A separate and very specific block is dedicated to Belarus. Its status is unambiguously described by the authors: de jure Belarus remains an independent state, but de facto its dependence on Moscow is so great that militarily it resembles a "military-logistical vassal."

According to the researchers, Lukashenka's opportunities to balance between Moscow and the West are now severely limited, and Minsk itself limited them.

The release of political prisoners or high-profile contacts with Americans do not change the main thing: in the event of a Russian attack on NATO's eastern flank, the territory of Belarus, according to the authors, will almost inevitably become a bridgehead, even if Lukashenka personally does not want it. It is of particular importance for a potential operation against the Baltic states, including cutting off the Suwalki Corridor.

Therefore, the West is advised not to expect that concessions to Lukashenka, even significant concessions, can "tear Belarus out of the Russian sphere of influence."

Instead, it is recommended to constantly track the movement of Russian troops and equipment in Belarus using satellites, OSINT, and artificial intelligence. The authors specifically warn that Belarusian railways and other civilian transport may be used for covert transfers of military personnel in civilian clothes.

The second proposal is to significantly expand sanctions against the Belarusian military-industrial complex and companies that assist the Russian war machine, including using materials from BelPol and other Belarusian structures. The third is to strengthen cooperation with Belarusian democratic forces, independent media, and analytical centers to have a direct channel of communication with Belarusian society and elites, bypassing state propaganda.

Павялічыць

Belarus helps Russia circumvent sanctions

The study states that Belarus has already become a special hub for parallel imports for the Russian military-industrial complex.

Referring to BelPol's investigation, the authors describe a scheme in which Japanese and Taiwanese components for thermal imagers, through intermediaries and financial channels, enter Belarus, are used by "Peleng" for the production of tank sights, and then sent to the Russian "Uralvagonzavod" for T-72 and T-90 tanks.

According to the study, Western sanctions so far cover only large enterprises such as "Peleng", BelOMA, and MZKT. Most of the approximately 120 identified logistical operators, civilian subcontractors, and even penitentiary institutions still remain outside the restrictions. The authors separately note that the work of political prisoners is also used in fulfilling Russian defense orders.

As a result, one of the proposed success measures for the West is formulated very specifically: to coordinate sanctions between the US, EU, UK, and Canada against the entire Belarusian military-industrial complex and civilian companies that secretly work for Russian defense.

What is ultimately proposed to the West

In fact, the authors call for a shift from attempting to "softly persuade" the Kremlin to a strategy of deterrence and resource deprivation.

This means continued support for Ukraine, expanding the production of inexpensive drones in Europe, striking sanctions against the shadow fleet and supply chains of Western components, blocking Russia's military and financial channels in Africa, and the fastest possible strengthening of NATO's eastern flank.

In the next 6-24 months, the authors consider a limited Russian escalation against the Baltic states to be particularly dangerous. And here Belarus is once again at the center of the scenario — as a territory without which it would be much harder for Russia to isolate the Baltics from the rest of Europe.

The authors note: even if all of Russia's military objectives in Ukraine are fully achieved, this will not be the end of Russian expansionism, but will only encourage it further — because ressentiment, the researchers emphasize, has no saturation point.

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