From waitress to sex informant: the story of a Ukrainian girl from the occupied territory
"Men under alcohol tell a lot of interesting things. They don't even think that the woman they paid could tell something to someone."
Photo: BBC / Getty Images
This is told by Albina, a subtle girl who has been providing sex services to Russian soldiers in the occupied territory for several years and extracts secrets from them, which she then passes on to Ukrainians.
Albina told the BBC what it's like to be a Ukrainian and share a bed with enemy soldiers, risking her own life.
Albina (name changed) is still quite young. She was born and lived her entire life in a town occupied by the Russian army during the full-scale invasion. The publication does not disclose the girl's real name or origin for her safety.
Before the war, Albina worked as a waitress, afterwards she was forced to go to a brothel, or, as it's called among themselves, an 'office,' to earn a living in the occupation. She has been there for several years.
Most of her clients are Russian army soldiers. She says that a few months after starting work in this field, she decided she wanted to become a spy to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Because she still hopes that Ukraine will regain control of her town.
The girl told the BBC that during her work, she engages in dialogues with men, and as soon as they reveal their secrets, some of which constitute state secrets, Albina passes them on to a coordinator in Ukrainian-controlled territory.
It happens that enemy military units or equipment, whose coordinates Albina shares, get 'hit,' which the girl learns about from the news.
"Once, my client, a soldier, blurted out to me the location of their headquarters. I passed this information to the coordinator, and a couple of days later, it was hit. There were many [Russian] officers there. The whole town was talking about it. Nobody could understand how they were found, how this information got out," says Albina.
"Of course, I wouldn't wish such work on anyone. But when it happened, I felt proud that I was able to help. That this was my contribution. Yes, maybe not many people will know about it, but there is resistance [in the occupied territories]," she adds.
Journalists could not independently verify Albina's words, but Ukrainian special services confirmed her story to them. Experts interviewed also say that the practice of involving women from the sex business for espionage is common worldwide.
Informant "Atesh"
Sex work is not legalized in either Ukraine or Russia, so in Russian-occupied territories, this work is also illegal and dangerous. Sex workers often become victims of physical and moral violence, feel unprotected, and have problems with physical and mental health.
In the Russian-occupied territories, this activity is punishable by fines, but a fine is not the biggest risk for Albina.
The girl says she lives with constant fear that people around her will one day notice what she's actually doing. There's no trust among her 'colleagues' either. Among the sex workers who work with Albina, there are also Russian girls who, due to various circumstances, were forced to come there.
The women are not told who owns the sex establishment where they work. They gather in a so-called 'office,' from where drivers take them to clients for appointments. Everything is prepaid.
"I can't say I have warm relations with the girls from Russia. I don't even know the names of many of them. Clients treat all of us as merchandise for which they pay money," Albina shares.
"Russian clients often vent about problems at work (they call service 'work'). There are men of other nationalities, not Russians, who are harsher. But you can also learn some information from them."
Retired SBU Major Ivan Stupak says that a similar scheme for obtaining information from sex workers existed long before the war. Both men and women working in the escort industry can sometimes be involved, but in both cases, these are isolated incidents.
Their testimonies cannot be used in court because, as a rule, they have no evidence, and it's solely about trust 'by word of mouth.' But during the war, their information is used differently. It can be additional data for conducting strikes, and leads for further investigations or target acquisition.
"We understand that the Russian side is perfectly aware of this. All girls who fall into the sights of Russian counterintelligence are checked for cooperation with Ukraine," says Ivan Stupak.
In open sources, one can find information about how women were trained to be spies during World War II. Some of them became sex workers to gather information in enemy territory. However, both then and now, there are no precise data regarding the number of female spies who were also sex workers.
Albina is not a professional spy. She began combining the escort industry with underground information gathering, the girl says, because she wanted to help Ukraine.
"At first, I didn't understand how and where I could transmit this information without being exposed," says Albina.
Then, on the city streets, the girl began to notice leaflets with Ukrainian symbols and realized that a resistance movement existed in her town.
One day, Albina came across an online message from the 'Atesh' organization, which called on people in the occupied territory to cooperate. That's how her work with 'Atesh' began.
"I'm in contact with the coordinator. We communicate via text. No calls. Immediately after transmitting information, I delete the correspondence," says Albina.
Albina does not receive a salary for this work. She says she does not cooperate with the movement to earn money.
What is "Atesh"?
"Atesh" is an organization that positions itself as a resistance movement of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars. According to its representative, the movement numbers thousands of people in occupied and Russian territories.
In an interview with the BBC, the "Atesh" coordinator stated that this network of people organizes sabotage, monitors Russians, pastes pro-Ukrainian leaflets in occupied territories, and transmits coordinates to Ukrainian special services and military personnel. They say they cooperate with all Ukrainian Defense Forces.
The "Atesh" coordinator notes that there are also agents among those working behind enemy lines in Russian factories, headquarters, or on railways. The organization publicly shares photos and video reports of sabotage.
In an interview with the BBC, the "Atesh" coordinator said that they receive information about enemy movements and the deployment of military equipment from people of various professions, including Albina's colleagues.
Not all of them are willing to talk about their activities, even anonymously. Albina is one of the few who shared what happens behind the scenes.
"Albina wrote to our official contact account. First, she went through the standard verification procedure — we had to make sure it wasn't an FSB trap. She proved her reliability by providing data that was quickly confirmed by other sources," says the "Atesh" coordinator.
"She has helped and continues to help very significantly. The information she transmits often concerns not just the movement of equipment, but the moods of the officer corps, redeployment plans discussed in private conversations, and the locations of specific headquarters, recreation bases where the occupiers feel safe. Thanks to her, there are fewer 'safe' places for them."
Russia has added "Atesh" to its list of terrorist organizations; the structure is mentioned in Russian treason verdicts. For example, last summer, Vitaly Grechishkin, a resident of the Tula region, was sentenced to 18 years in prison under this article. Court materials state that the man transmitted the coordinates of a Russian energy complex to Ukrainian special services. The transfer occurred via Telegram to a representative of the "foreign organization Atesh".
The BBC cannot confirm that Grechishkin was indeed an "Atesh" agent, and the organization itself does not comment on this, nor do other security structures in Ukraine. This area is very closed.
"Atesh" employees insist that they adhere strictly to security rules when transmitting information and do everything to reduce the level of danger for their agents. However, they admit that cases of agents being exposed to the enemy have indeed occurred. At the same time, Ukrainian press and official statements typically do not focus on this.
In Ukrainian-controlled territories, underground resistance movements are often mentioned online; they openly recruit, as they are interested in attracting as many agents as possible into their network and intimidating the enemy through information. In Russia, names of such Ukrainian organizations are scarce in the media, obviously to avoid advertising them unnecessarily.
The Main Intelligence Directorate and the SBU confirmed in a comment to the BBC that "Atesh" is indeed one of the structures that helps gather information for special services. However, before striking, any information is verified from various sources.
The BBC cannot independently verify the level of involvement of resistance movements in organizing Ukrainian military operations. In the conditions of information warfare, the scale of underground networks may be publicly distorted to disorient the enemy.
"Atesh" reported that there are many people, they are working. I have doubts that there are many people there. They are all fragmented. And every organization - SBU, HUR, Foreign Intelligence Service, SSO - they try to protect their people. They don't tell anyone their sources in the occupied territory. Because it's always a person's life," says Ivan Stupak.
"We don't openly know. But, to me, it's more about creating an impression of scale. Intelligence has its own data and its own sources. They acquire it themselves and then brand it under 'Atesh.' Russians work the same way. You might have read news like 'The coordinator of the Mykolaiv underground reported...' or 'The coordinator of the Kherson underground reported...'. This is to defocus the attention of Ukrainian counterintelligence, so we run around, search, and stumble."
In an interview with the BBC, "Atesh" said that it deliberately does not publish precise figures confirming the scale of its work, as Russia could exploit this. Accordingly, the answer to the question of what in their activities is real and what is created informationally for the enemy, we may only know after the war ends.
Already, as proof of its effectiveness, "Atesh" cites the fact that its organization is recognized as extremist in Russia. They say, "this is a mark of quality." "Atesh" assures that they have enough resources to support their activities. At the same time, the organization does not deny its participation in information warfare. "Atesh" calls publicity its weapon. They say it gives hope to Ukrainians in occupation and attracts new agents.
Former Deputy Head of the SBU Viktor Yahun told the BBC in an interview that all underground movements, including "Atesh," perform three functions: demoralize the enemy, overload their intelligence, and stimulate new people to passive cooperation without active involvement.
"Atesh" is a hybrid structure. It's a real network plus a truly powerful information superstructure. This is a typical format for modern warfare. Such movements almost never exist in pure form," says Viktor Yahun. "'Atesh' is not a myth, but also not a mass partisan army. This network has a limited size and is integrated into the broader architecture of Ukrainian special services."
Albina says that the coordinator she communicates with never informs her about the results of military operations or whether the information she provided was useful. The girl can only guess about her effectiveness, piecing together her actions and news about enemy objects being destroyed. She says there were cases when clients about whom the woman had passed on information returned to her for services again.
"Every time I get very anxious. It always feels like something will happen now, they'll find out now, they'll figure it out now because I asked too many questions," says Albina.
Over three years of experience, the girl says, she started listening more than asking.
"They themselves start conversations. They boast about how much money they earn, saying, 'We came to this place, and now we have a lot of money.' What else do they talk about? For example, movements. He tells me he'll be leaving here soon. Or, for example, they might complain that the commander didn't pay their salary. I remember there was a guy who emotionally told how they couldn't extract a comrade [from the battlefield] and had to leave him there," Albina recalls.
The girl says that there are also quiet periods in this cooperation, as the information shared by the men is of no value.
Albina does not intend to remain a sex worker-informant forever. She understands it's a game of roulette. And while Albina can stop reporting information about enemy movements at any moment, she says leaving the escort industry requires careful planning, at a "safe moment".
Summarizing the contribution of sex workers to the work of special services, Viktor Yahun describes their role as auxiliary: "An auxiliary, intelligence, informational [role]. But by no means operational. These are not agents who, roughly speaking, guide missiles, but a source of primary information. Their value lies not in technical knowledge, but precisely in access to informal conversations and primary information. And in lowering the guard of the interlocutor, who simply doesn't pay attention to them."
The involvement of sex workers in gathering intelligence information was also mentioned last year by Kyrylo Budanov in an interview. At that time, the head of the HUR noted that thanks to the escort industry, information of a level that an ordinary intelligence officer could only dream of could be obtained.
Russia's war against Ukraine has fundamentally changed not only our ideas about the weapons of modern warfare but also about what a modern resistance movement looks like. Experts and special services officials say that it is unlikely that intelligence networks like those we read about in spy novels exist in the modern space. Now, every person is a potential autonomous agent. Resistance movements are no longer a large number of people in one secret location.
To quickly transmit information, there's no need to meet or call a person. You might never even find out what they actually look like.
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