Three versions of one failure: how Paznyak and Matskevich clashed in the 1995 parliamentary elections

Zianon Paznyak, Uladzimir Matskevich. Photo: Nasha Niva

Spring 1995. Elections to the Supreme Soviet — the first parliamentary elections after Aliaksandr Lukashenka came to power. The country seemingly still lived by old rules, but in reality, it would soon fall into a different political era. And at this very moment, in one electoral constituency, Angarskaya, two people met who, it seemed, were on the same side of the barricades — Zianon Paznyak from the BPF and methodologist Uladzimir Matskevich from the United Democratic Party of Belarus (UDB). But one went to the elections to win, while the other, as he himself would later say, — to "research through action." In the end, both lost.

For the BPF team, this is a story of a stab in the back and the weakening of the democratic camp. For Matskevich — a story of an attempt to test reality on himself and the political blindness of the opposition at the time. For UDB leader Aliaksandr Dabravolski — an example of how ambitions triumphed over a common goal.

Elections that the authorities effectively disrupted

In the early 1990s, the Belarusian Popular Front, led by Zianon Paznyak, was a force that shaped the national political agenda: language, symbolism, independence, Belarusian statehood. In the Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation, the Front members were in the minority, but it was a vocal, organized, and influential minority.

However, a turning point occurred in 1994: Aliaksandr Lukashenka, who very quickly entered into confrontation with the parliament, won the presidential elections. In the spring of 1995, a referendum on language, symbolism, and integration with Russia took place. And simultaneously — elections to the new parliament.

According to participants, the entire 1995 campaign was disrupted by the authorities, including through Lukashenka's public stance, who openly declared that he would not go to vote, because "they will cheat anyway." Such words could not but affect voter turnout.

The result was devastating: the imperfection of the electoral legislation led to the fact that due to low voter turnout, even after two rounds, only 119 deputies could be elected (if less than 50% of voters came to the polls, the elections in that constituency were considered not to have taken place). This was not enough to form the Supreme Soviet: according to the law, at least 174 mandates were required — no less than two-thirds of the full composition of 260 people. In most constituencies, voting yielded no result, second rounds often resolved nothing, and later by-elections had to be held. As a result, no representative of the BPF entered the new parliament.

Siarhei Naumchyk: Matskevich's participation in the elections weakened Paznyak

The most categorical position regarding those events is held by representatives of the BPF. Siarhei Naumchyk, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus of the 12th convocation, who was inside this political kitchen, considers the actions of the UDB a senseless stab in the back:

"Nominating a candidate from one democratic party against the leader of another — this is a blow against the leader, and no less so against the party itself. Election results are often decided by one or two percent, even a few dozen votes."

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Siarhei Naumchyk. Archival photo by Siarhei Hudzilin

Especially since the BPF and the UDB were in many ways similar. For example, they were united in their course towards decommunization and democracy, market reforms, and the building of state institutions. There were certain disagreements in views on national revival and relations with Russia, while the UDB did not support the 1995 referendum and condemned the beating of BPF deputies. But these two players had diametrically opposite views on the introduction of the presidency: the UDB — for a presidency, the BPF — for a parliamentary republic.

Siarhei Naumchyk recalls: relations between the BPF and the United Democratic Party were far from ideal even before 1995. Tensions escalated during the 1994 presidential elections, when the UDB supported Shushkevich, and the BPF — its leader Zianon Paznyak. Therefore, the appearance of a competitor from the same democratic camp in one constituency looked like a continuation of this confrontation.

But, he emphasizes, the main enemy of the BPF was not internal disputes, but the state and communist machine.

"The main instrument of the authorities' struggle against the BPF was not alternative candidates from democratic parties, but candidates from the Communist Party, led by Siarhei Kalyakin. The communists put forward their candidates in all constituencies where the Front members ran, and had both organizational and ideological — through state media — support from Lukashenka's administration. They took revenge on the BPF and Paznyak personally for Kurapaty and for Independence," says Naumchyk.

Divided electorate and psychological effect

Naumchyk admits: if one looks at the dry arithmetic, it cannot be confidently said that Paznyak would have become a deputy without Matskevich. But, according to him, elections are not just mathematics.

"In the first round, Paznyak took first place, but did not get the required 50% for election. His main communist opponent was second, Matskevich — fourth. I don't have Paznyak's exact numbers now, but, as far as I remember, it was less than 40%, so even if Matskevich's 12% were added, the BPF leader might not have been elected. But this is arithmetical.

However, there was a significant psychological moment which, in my opinion, influenced the results — the very presence of an alternative democratic candidate.

In the second round, Paznyak was in second place, the communist took first, but he also did not get the required 50%. As far as I can recall the discussions in the BPF at that time, some believed that if Paznyak had not had a competitor from the democratic camp in the first round, it would not have fractured, not demoralized the democratic electorate. Because those who voted for Matskevich did not go to vote in the second round, and if Matskevich had not been there, they would have voted for the BPF leader in both the first and second rounds.

I don't know how realistic this was for the second round. Because the second round took place after the announcement of the results of the so-called referendum on language, coat of arms, and flag, which were a strong blow to the nationally conscious part of society. But the fact that in the first round, the presence of an opponent from the democratic camp for the BPF leader, besides splitting votes, created a negative psychological background — this is undeniable. Certainly, there were those who did not come to vote even in the first round, thinking — is it worth going to vote for you if you cannot agree among yourselves?" — Siarhei Naumchyk is convinced.

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Rally in Yanka Kupala Park. Vasil Bykau, Siarhei Naumchyk, Artur Volski, Ryhor Baradulin. Photo by Halina Naumchyk, July 3, 1994. Source: zbsb.info

He emphasizes: Matskevich's participation in the elections unequivocally contributed to the weakening of Paznyak and the authorities' desire not to allow the BPF leader into the Supreme Soviet.

"But regardless of any factors, the authorities would not have allowed not only Paznyak, but generally no candidate from the BPF into the new Supreme Soviet. This was a strategic goal of the authorities. If Matskevich had not been there, they would have used something else. Just as in 1994 Moscow used the ambitions of the "young wolves" who nominated Lukashenka. If there had been no Hanchar and Bulakhau — they would have found others. One should not forget about falsifications, the authorities used them to the fullest in the elections in spring and in the "by-elections" in autumn 1995.

By the way, in autumn, the UDB did not put forward competitors to the BPF leaders, just as we did not put forward ours to them. Against Paznyak in Smarhon, a communist ran, and the falsifications there were total. The then chairman of the Central Election Commission, Abramovich, at a commission meeting, admitted their existence, even ordered the materials to be handed over to the Prosecutor General's Office, but... approved the election results, and soon became deputy head of the presidential administration.

True, Mr. Matskevich denied the existence of falsifications, and disputed Vasil Bykau's words that "the elections were falsified from start to finish," stating that Bykau had no proof. In reality, the BPF had proof of falsifications literally in every constituency where we had our candidates," says Naumchyk.

Matskevich: They couldn't imagine the onset of fascism

Uladzimir Matskevich believes that the problem was much deeper and not about him. For him, the main thing in that story is not the question of how many votes he took from whom, but how the very mechanism of elections in Belarus had already changed at that moment.

Shortly before the elections, he returned to Belarus and found himself close to politics as a consultant to the United Democratic Party. He tried to convince his interlocutors: their perception of political reality no longer corresponded to what was actually happening. But, according to him, he was not heard.

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Uladzimir Matskevich, 2026. Photo: Nasha Niva

"This was already a different country. But a significant part of the opposition simply did not notice it. They simply could not imagine the onset of fascism. For that election campaign, I wrote the text "April Theses." It appeared after the beating of deputies of the BPF faction in the Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation. And what happened was indicative: everything passed almost quietly, without a real reaction from society. The BPF faction, of course, was outraged, but overall the country swallowed it.

No one perceived this as a signal. Although in essence, it resembled the Reichstag fire in Germany in 1933 — a demonstration that the period of relative freedom was over. The times of Kebich, with their imperfect, but still democracy, were in the past. The regime had not yet been fully formed, but its contours were already visible: pressure on media, white spots in newspapers, squeezing out businesses, the first signs of control.

Politicians did not see this. They continued to live in the illusions of the early 90s — in the belief that freedom and independence were irreversible, that everything would continue on its own.

I looked at it differently, as an analyst, with fresh eyes. And I saw that the situation was developing in the opposite direction. But this view was unpopular, it went against the general mood. And this is the tragedy of that time: we missed the moment when something could still be changed."

"If you're so smart — go yourself"

Matskevich decided to participate in the parliamentary elections not because he dreamed of a mandate, but because he wanted to test his own hypothesis in practice:

"Frankly, I myself was not going to run for deputy. I had only returned to Minsk about a year ago, was engaged in analytics, and generally believed that my business was education reform. But what I saw diverged very strongly from the ideas of opposition politicians and analytical centers. It seemed to me that their assessments were superficial, unprofessional, that they simply did not understand what was happening.

I tried to explain this, including to the United Democratic Party, led by Aliaksandr Dabravolski. But I was poorly heard. And at some point, they practically told me: if you are so smart — then go become a deputy yourself and get involved in politics.

I agreed. But not as a politician, but as an analyst who wants to test his hypothesis."

At the same time, according to Matskevich, he immediately asked for no ordinary constituency, but the most challenging one — where the main political figures were running. He names three surnames: Paznyak, Shushkevich, Karpenka.

"I specifically asked for a constituency with the strongest candidates — where clear favorites were running. Because, in my assessment, none of them should have received sufficient support: they were already losing popularity, although they themselves did not realize it.

They didn't believe me. But in the end, they gave me Paznyak's constituency. In fact, it would have been even more interesting for me to run against Shushkevich. But Aliaksandr Dabravolski and the party leadership did not want to conflict with either him or Karpenka.

With Zianon Paznyak, the situation looked different: cooperation between the BPF and the United Democratic Party was already tense anyway. Besides, everyone was sure that Paznyak would win in his constituency regardless.

And not only the party thought so. Businessmen with whom I worked as a business consultant at the time also thought so. I wanted to get help, money for my campaign. Everyone I approached said: "Well, are you crazy? Paznyak will definitely win there."

As a result, I conducted the campaign practically with my own money. The party helped minimally — they printed a few leaflets. Everything else was the work of volunteers: students, postgraduate students, colleagues," Uladzimir Matskevich recalls.

It should be noted that in one of his books, Matskevich explained his logic at the time slightly differently: "As a researcher, the author understood that the constituency was very convenient, because Paznyak's chances of reaching the second round were very high, but Paznyak had no chance of winning in the second round. The author's reaching the second round would be a difficult task, but then everything became simpler."

Matskevich writes here about himself in the third person

It seems that Matskevich ideally hoped to slip into the second round with Paznyak from second place. And in the second round, to take advantage of Paznyak's negative rating and, by gathering the votes of his haters, to win. However, it did not work out. Matskevich only got fourth place.

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Referendum on May 14, 1995. Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus. Voting at polling station №3 of the 251st Masherau constituency of the capital. Minsk. Photo: Belarusian Encyclopedia

"We didn't collapse the campaign, we revived it"

To the remark that his participation could have drawn votes away from Paznyak and hindered him in the elections, Matskevich replies: in his opinion, it was precisely his campaign that gave that constituency dynamism.

"If it weren't for us, the BPF campaign in that constituency, most likely, would have been quite modest. But we went out with pickets, conducted active agitation, and Paznyak's headquarters also had to get involved. As a result, there was a situation: two teams, two candidates, but actually with the same agenda. But even if we add Zianon Paznyak's votes and mine, according to official results, they still did not give the necessary 50% plus one. By that time, Zianon Paznyak no longer had the support and advantage in his constituency that he had in the first elections; his popularity was falling.

The same was confirmed by the subsequent December elections, when he ran in Smarhon — and again without success. Then not a single BPF candidate made it to parliament. The political situation had changed, and new people, new approaches were needed. It was with this understanding that I participated in the creation of the United Civic Party.

We worked with candidates, tried to build a different logic of participation in elections. And in a sense, this yielded results: in the Supreme Soviet of the 13th convocation, at least one opposition faction was finally formed. In those conditions, it was already something."

The liberals from the United Civic Party — which was created on the basis of the United Democratic Party — indeed managed to create the "Civic Action" faction with 15 deputies. The social democrats also formed their small faction. These two opposition forces in 1996 would become the ferment for an unexpected alliance with the dominant agrarians and communists in an attempt to stop the country's slide into dictatorship.

Matskevich notes that the voting results were confirmation for him — elections were already being falsified then. He calls Siarhei Naumchyk's remark that he previously denied falsifications a mistaken interpretation of his words. But the main thing, in his opinion, is not the falsifications themselves.

"The point is that at that moment, a different mechanism began to form. The state gained the ability to control elections long before election day — through media, the symbolic space, money. Opposition candidates could simply be blocked economically, informationally, organizationally, so that the ballots did not even come down to real competition.

Therefore, my thesis was that elections become invalid not only through falsifications. They can be disrupted even without direct fraud on election day through control over the entire process. It was precisely this — how it happens, how the system works — that I wanted to understand through my participation. This was my research through action," says Matskevich.

Aliaksandr Dabravolski: It was a mistake

Aliaksandr Dabravolski has his own vision of those events. When asked why his party nominated Matskevich in Paznyak's constituency, he answers more pragmatically than Naumchyk and Matskevich:

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Aliaksandr Dabravolski. Photo: Nasha Niva

"In 1995, there were negotiations about dividing constituencies between candidates from democratic parties. An agreement could not be reached. The BPF nominated its candidates in many constituencies, including mine. We had a heated discussion about what to do. At that time, we were in the process of uniting with the Civic Party, and we consulted with them. I personally considered it a bad idea to nominate a candidate in Paznyak's constituency, although they cited the example of my constituency, where I had previously won elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. But Matskevich insisted, and by a majority vote, he was nominated as a candidate.

That example shows that the prevalence of ambitions over the pursuit of common goals does not lead to good. I have repeatedly said that if, in addition to us, there had been BPF deputies in the Supreme Soviet in 1996, the chances of impeachment would have been much higher."

Hero of Perestroika, but not a politician of a new era?

Matskevich himself does not deny Paznyak's significance:

"I perceived Paznyak as a hero of perestroika, as one of the key figures at the beginning of Belarusian independence. And what the BPF faction did in the Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation — that was truly a feat: in a complete minority, they managed to influence the right decisions, essentially leading this confused, indecisive parliament."

But, in his opinion, Paznyak's star had already set in 1992, when new elections for the Supreme Soviet could not be achieved:

"Because the situation was absurd: the country was already independent, but the parliament was still Soviet, elected as a regional body within the USSR. It was dysfunctional, inadequate to reality, and only thanks to the BPF was anything still moving in it.

And at that moment, at the peak of popularity, the main step did not happen — a reboot of power. After that, everything went downhill. Paznyak's ratings began to fall, a systemic anti-campaign was launched against the BPF — by old communist structures, special services, media.

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Zianon Paznyak on Freedom Day 1995 in Minsk. Photo: photo.bymedia.net from Nasha Niva archive

At the same time, I always regarded Paznyak with great respect as an ideologue. And in many ways, his views are still close to me today. But as a politician, in my opinion, he did not fully correspond to that reality. Politics requires not only principledness, but also flexibility, the ability to play a complex game, sometimes to compromise.

Paznyak is different. He is principled, unyielding, direct. And it is precisely this that makes him a strong ideologue, but at the same time — a difficult, non-mainstream politician."

For one — experience. For others — an existential moment

Matskevich does not hide: he considers his participation in the elections fruitful. According to him, it was precisely on the basis of that experience that he later formulated the concept of three generations of political technologies and began to look at all subsequent campaigns differently.

"The main thing that 1995 gave me was the understanding: politics is not explained only by ratings, sociology, or the desires of politicians themselves. The most accurate picture is given only by research through action — when you are inside the process and see how it really works," says Uladzimir Matskevich.

Siarhei Naumchyk looks at it from a different perspective: for Matskevich it was research, an experiment, but for the BPF it was a moment when the fate of the country was being decided.

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19 BPF deputies in the Supreme Soviet on April 11, 1995, declared a hunger strike right in the Oval Hall. Second from left with a newspaper is Siarhei Naumchyk. Archival photo

"Uladzimir Matskevich himself called his participation in the elections "research through action" and considered this experiment successful. But for us, the elections were not an experiment. They determined not the fates of specific politicians, and not even the future of democracy, but the fate of Belarusians as a nation.

The years 1994-95 were existential for the country: either Belarus would be independent, and for this, it was necessary to distance itself further from Russia, or it would be with Russia, which means its sovereignty would diminish, and Belarusians would be under threat of disappearance as a nation.

Vasil Bykau then called on society, democratic parties to unite around the Belarusian Popular Front, which steadfastly defended national interests. Even today I am convinced that at that time the BPF, led by Paznyak, was the only political force capable of consistently pursuing a policy of building an independent state and, what is especially important, — the only one capable of resisting Russia's pressure. Moreover, at that time, such resistance would not have caused the introduction of Russian tanks; Belarus is still not Chechnya. It was a chance, but it was lost: the leaders of the democratic parties, although invariably expressing respect for Bykau, unfortunately, did not heed him.

By the way, some democrats who entered the Supreme Soviet-13 then scoffed at us, saying that, supposedly, the BPF suffered a crushing defeat. I don't recall to whom exactly, but I then said: "They started with us, you will be next." And so it happened — from 1996, none of them were ever allowed into "parliament" again.

Would Paznyak have changed the history of 1996?

What would have happened if Zianon Paznyak had still made it into the Supreme Soviet of the 13th convocation? Could he have influenced the main political drama of that time — the attempt to impeach Aliaksandr Lukashenka in 1996?

Here, the versions diverge again.

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Zianon Paznyak speaking in the Supreme Soviet. Archival photo

Siarhei Naumchyk is convinced: the presence of the BPF in parliament was fundamental. After the elections, there were no Front members in the hall, and some democratic deputies initially sought compromise with Lukashenka, tried to negotiate with him, unlike the BPF, which, according to him, never had illusions.

This, in his opinion, became the fatal difference. While some still believed in the possibility of an agreement, time was working against them. Deputies only came to the idea of impeachment in August — when, in essence, it was already too late.

The culmination was November 1996 and the so-called night agreement, when Siamion Sharetski and Valer Tsikhinya signed an agreement with Lukashenka to stop the impeachment procedure.

Meanwhile, Naumchyk emphasizes, impeachment itself was real.

"Many recall how on the eve of this, Lukashenka spoke on television with obvious agitation — his hands were trembling. Sharetski later stated that commanders of military units said: if impeachment was announced, they were ready "to deliver Lukashenka in chains."

But at the last moment, Moscow intervened in the game. High-ranking Russian officials flew to Minsk — a Kremlin landing party which, according to Naumchyk, virtually saved Lukashenka.

And it is here that he introduces Paznyak — as a figure who could have behaved differently:

"A few years later in Prague, Sharetski himself confessed: "Yeltsin called me! Do you understand — Yeltsin!" Then one of those present, writer Uladzimir Arlou, said: "Paznyak would have sent that Yeltsin to hell..." And this, in essence, reflects the difference in behavior.

In 1996, I myself asked Paznyak what he would have done if he had been there. He replied: "I would have simply pulled Sharetski by the collar from the table. Physically." And, frankly, I have no doubt that he would have done so. Neither Kalyakin nor Karpenka would have gone for that. But Paznyak — he could have.

I often read that if Paznyak had not gone into emigration, impeachment would have happened. No, Paznyak's mere presence in Belarus was not enough. The night agreement would have been thwarted only if Paznyak had been in the room, and he could only have been there if he had deputy status."

Uladzimir Matskevich sees the situation differently. He does not deny the role of personality in politics, but insists: the system was already such that even a strong figure alone could not guaranteed to change something.

He notes: there were already people in parliament who fought for impeachment — Viktar Hanchar, Henadz Karpenka, other deputies. It was a struggle for every vote. But the decisive break occurred at the system level — under pressure from Moscow and internal compromises.

Moreover, Matskevich believes that the main mistake was elsewhere: the deputies did not let the people from the square into the Supreme Soviet building to protect it.

"I believe that it was in 1996 that the first Maidan could have happened in Belarus. If, on that critical night, people had not just stood outside and dispersed, but had occupied the building. But the deputies did not go for that," he says.

And therefore concludes: Paznyak could have changed something, but not necessarily solved everything.

It is important to note: Stanislau Shushkevich and Henadz Karpenka, against whom Uladzimir Matskevich was also ready to run, nevertheless won in their Minsk constituencies in 1995. Was this because the democratic electorate in those constituencies was not divided from the beginning? Or because centrist candidates had a better rating than Paznyak? There is no answer to this question.

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