"They see Belarus as part of Russia". What the rise of "Alternative for Germany" means, how far it can go, and how Belarusians should position themselves

"Alternative for Germany" received 43.8% of the votes in the Saxony-Anhalt elections — the best result for the far-right in state elections in post-war Germany. The party missed an absolute majority by just three seats. How realistic is its rise to power across the entire country, and would such a rise mean a rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow? And would such a rapprochement come at the cost of Eastern Europe?

Political Earthquake

Just five years ago, "Alternative for Germany" received 20.8% of the votes in the former East German state of Saxony-Anhalt. Now its result has more than doubled — to 43.8%. The AfD won 39 out of 83 seats in the state parliament. For an independent majority, 42 are needed.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz's Christian Democratic Union garnered only 17.2%. For a party that won here in the previous elections with 37.1%, this is a real failure.

"This is a political earthquake. Even 43.8% for the AfD is not such a big sensation, as polls predicted over 40% for them. The real disaster is the result of the Christian Democrats," says historian and political observer Alexander Friedman.

"Alternative for Germany" emerged in 2013 as a Eurosceptic party protesting against the bailout of Eurozone countries at the expense of German taxpayers. Today, the AfD demands maximum restriction of migration, returning some powers from the EU level to national states, abandoning current climate and energy policies, developing nuclear energy, and supporting traditional families. In foreign policy, the party opposes military aid to Ukraine, demands the lifting of sanctions against Russia, and the restoration of economic cooperation with it.

A peculiarity of the situation is that the local Office for the Protection of the Constitution has considered the Saxony-Anhalt state branch of the AfD to be "proven right-wing extremist" since 2023. In the office's latest report, it was named the greatest threat to democracy in this federal state.

However, 43.8% does not automatically mean that the AfD has taken power. Traditional parties have long adhered to the principle of a "cordon sanitaire" and refused to form coalitions with it. But now they themselves do not have enough votes to form a stable majority.

The "Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance," which won five seats, could be decisive. While the AfD is called right-wing populist, the BSW (Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht) is left-wing populist. This party criticizes sanctions against Russia and calls for the restoration of economic relations with Moscow. Theoretically, its votes would be enough to bring the AfD to power in Magdeburg.

Why Germans Vote for AfD

Alexander Friedman sees the election results as evidence of deep German dissatisfaction with the country's economic situation.

The German economy has been experiencing stagnation for several years: businesses are closing, jobs are being cut, and the automotive industry is in a difficult position. Economic uncertainty is compounded by competition from migrants for jobs, the fear of losing the previous standard of living, and disillusionment with the government's ability to change anything. This is especially strongly felt in the former East German states, where wages and accumulated wealth are still lower than in the west of the country.

Павялічыць

The AfD managed to gather these fears into simple election slogans: close borders, deport illegal migrants, abandon expensive climate policies, bring back cheap gas, and stop spending money on foreign wars. The argument that Berlin finds billions for weapons and aid to Ukraine but cannot find money for its own citizens resonated particularly well.

"The government will now have to explain much more and better why supporting Ukraine is important for Germany itself. The explanation given so far has clearly not worked," Friedman notes.

Rudkouski Does Not Consider AfD Radicals

Political scientist Piotr Rudkouski suggests looking at the AfD's success differently. He believes that the terms "radical right" and "national populists" are often used as labels that explain little about the party's program content.

"If we put aside emotions and ideological lenses, we will see a program that in many points could have belonged to the Christian Democratic Union of the 1990s or early 2000s," Rudkouski believes.

In his opinion, some decisions of previous governments were precisely radical: the rejection of nuclear energy while simultaneously relying on Russian gas, an expensive energy transition, and the reception of over a million migrants in 2015 without sufficiently effective integration mechanisms. Therefore, Rudkouski calls the AfD's success a reaction to the radicalism of previous years.

Friedman, in turn, points to another trend: while some European right-wing parties become more moderate when given a chance at power, the AfD moves in the opposite direction.

"In Italy, and partly in France, we observe a deradicalization of the right. The AfD, on the contrary, is becoming increasingly radical. That's why even Italian and French right-wing parties do not want to cooperate with it," he says.

What "Alternative for Germany" Can Really Change

Saxony-Anhalt is a state with a population of about two million people and little economic weight. Even if the AfD forms a government there, it will not be able to independently stop German aid to Ukraine, cancel sanctions against Russia, or withdraw Germany from NATO. Foreign policy falls under the competence of the federal government.

However, state authorities have significant influence over education, culture, police, local media, and administrative work.

The AfD promised to restore school exchanges with Russia and expand the teaching of the Russian language. The party also proposed transferring refugee children with uncertain status to separate classes, and children with disabilities to special schools.

"They can indeed try to implement this. But the AfD coming to power in Magdeburg does not mean that Germany will immediately stop aid to Ukraine. Economic consequences are also possible. Some foreign companies might refuse to invest in a state governed by a right-wing extremist party. The AfD itself understands this," Friedman emphasizes.

The party faces a dilemma. Its leadership wants to come to power for the first time, but a significant portion of its radical promises cannot be fulfilled within the powers of a state government and German law. Actual governance might show voters that simple solutions do not exist, ultimately weakening support for the AfD.

Can "Alternative for Germany" Take Power Across the Entire Country?

A victory in one eastern state does not yet mean an inevitable victory across the entire country. The AfD's results in the east are traditionally much higher than in the west. It will be difficult for the party to repeat 43.8% in federal elections in the near future.

But it should not be underestimated either. In the 2025 Bundestag elections, the AfD received over 20% of the votes and became the country's second political force. Now its rating has already overtaken the CDU/CSU.

The main obstacle for the AfD remains the lack of acceptable coalition partners. As long as the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, "Greens," and Left refuse to cooperate with it, a mere first place in elections is not enough.

The situation will change if the "cordon sanitaire" begins to break down — for example, if part of the CDU decides that it is better to enter a coalition with the AfD than to form unstable governments with ideologically distant parties. Another scenario is a tactical alliance between the AfD and Sahra Wagenknecht's left-wing populists. Rudkouski considers this scenario most favorable for a shift in Germany towards normalizing relations with Moscow.

Here arises a historical parallel with interwar Germany. It is incorrect to equate the AfD with the Nazi party, but certain political mechanisms can be compared: the division of society into "true people" and "outsiders," the search for culprits among minorities and migrants — only then it was Jews and Slavs, the promise of national revival, attacks on media and the political establishment, the gradual expansion of the boundaries of what is considered acceptable in public politics.

Another disturbing parallel is the hope of traditional conservatives that a radical party could be allowed into power, its popularity exploited, and then kept under control. A similar line of thinking was held by some German conservative elites before Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in January 1933. In Hitler's first government, the Nazis received only three positions, and their partners were convinced they could limit the new chancellor. However, within a few months, the Nazis destroyed parliamentary democracy.

But it cannot be said that Germany is repeating the path of 1933. The modern country fundamentally differs from the Weimar Republic: it has strong courts, a federal system, free media, and constitutional mechanisms, created in part to prevent a new dictatorship.

"Even the AfD coming to state power does not mean that independent justice and free media will disappear tomorrow. The party does not have such capabilities. I'm not even sure it has the desire to go that far," Friedman says.

Will Germany and Russia Again Divide Eastern Europe into Spheres of Influence?

There is no reason to expect Germany and Russia to literally draw new borders on a map today. Germany is bound by its membership in the EU and NATO, and its modern state structure fundamentally differs from the Third Reich. But in the 21st century, the division of spheres of influence does not necessarily look like a secret protocol. It can happen differently: through the cessation of support for Ukraine, the recognition of Russian conquests, the resumption of economic cooperation with Moscow, and tacit agreement that Belarus remains within Russia's sphere of control.

Alexander Friedman notes that the AfD is primarily interested in Russia, not Belarus.

"Some of its deputies visited Belarus and sent inquiries to the German government, including about the financing of Belarusian democratic forces. However, for the AfD leadership in Saxony-Anhalt, Belarus remains a marginal topic. If you were to ask Ulrich Sigmund about Belarus, he would most likely not be able to say much. They are interested in Russia.

If they perceive Belarus, it is in the Russian context. The AfD has a very Russocentric view of Eastern Europe, and especially of Belarus," Friedman says.

What Will Happen to Lukashenka and Democratic Forces?

Piotr Rudkouski does not expect that if the AfD participates in the government, Germany will instantly open up to Lukashenka's regime. But attempts at limited normalization are possible, especially where it would allow reducing costs for German business or solving specific security problems. For example, AfD representatives could lobby for concessions to Minsk in exchange for ending migration blackmail at the EU borders.

A much more likely consequence is a reduction in support for Belarusian democratic forces, independent media, and public organizations.

"From the logic of the AfD's program, it follows that Belarusian NGOs may be perceived as a matter for Belarusians themselves, to whom German taxpayers owe nothing," Rudkouski says.

Павялічыць

And for such a shift, the AfD does not necessarily have to enter the government itself. Its growth already forces traditional parties to adopt its agenda, not only on migration but also on foreign aid.

What Will Happen to Belarusians in Germany?

For Belarusians living in Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD coming to state power could have concrete consequences, especially for people with uncertain migration status, refugees, and families with children.

Belarusians are not a specific target of the party. Its rhetoric is primarily directed against migrants from Asian countries and refugees from Ukraine, who are accused of exploiting the German social system.

Moreover, the expert says, some Russian-speaking citizens of Germany, including some from Belarus, themselves support the AfD. They do not always apply the anti-migration rhetoric to themselves, as they consider themselves integrated, working, and paying taxes. However, with a general tightening of restrictions, the difference between "good" and "bad" migrants may not be so obvious.

"It cannot be said that without the AfD, Germany will remain completely open, and with the AfD, it will suddenly close. Migration pressure and administrative problems already force authorities to introduce restrictions. The difference is that the AfD speaks about this openly, while traditional forces do the same more quietly," Rudkouski believes.

Piotr Rudkouski believes that the most real threats to Belarusians are a decrease in support for democratic Belarus.

What is the Right Tactic for Belarusians Regarding the AfD?

Alexander Friedman urges not to panic. The AfD has not even formed a state government in the East German state yet, and its capabilities are limited by law and strong democratic institutions.

"This is a serious challenge for German democracy, but the danger should not be exaggerated yet. The situation should be assessed rationally and calmly," Friedman says.

Rudkouski sees the rightward shift as a signal for Belarusian democratic forces: the old rhetoric "we are victims of the regime, so help us" will work less and less effectively. In his opinion, Belarusians should get less involved in Europe's internal ideological wars and better explain how democratic Belarus and the Belarusian diaspora are useful to Europeans themselves.

"It is necessary to show that Belarusians in the EU are doctors, engineers, IT specialists, and builders who work, pay taxes, respect laws, and integrate easily. And democratic Belarus is not only a victim in need of help but a potential ally in ensuring regional security and economic stability," Rudkouski says.

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