Four ways to end the war in Iran

On a street in Tehran. March 3, 2026. Photo: AP Photo / Vahid Salemi

The situation was analyzed by the publication's leading Middle East experts: Richard Spencer, a long-time correspondent for The Times in the region, and Samer Al-Atrash, a specialist in the geopolitics of the Islamic world.

According to experts, the future of the region now balances between four scenarios.

1. Regime Survival

There are few precedents for overthrowing a regime, even by the might of the United States, through an air campaign alone. It remains entirely possible that Trump and Netanyahu will eventually halt the bombings, declaring victory in the destruction of the nuclear program, missile bases, a significant part of the military hierarchy, and the higher clergy.

Meanwhile, the surviving apparatus may choose other regime leaders. A three-person governing committee has already been appointed, including President Pezeshkian, radical cleric Ayatollah Alireza Arafeh, and Supreme Court Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje'i. Arafeh (who is currently Iran's interim Supreme Leader) stated on Monday that he hopes for a swift election of a new Supreme Leader.

Among the possible candidates are Arafeh himself, Mojtaba Khamenei — the son of the deceased Ayatollah, Hassan Khomeini — the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, as well as Ayatollah Mohammad Mehdi Mirbagheri, who represents the hardline faction.

Former President Hassan Rouhani is also sometimes mentioned. Under his leadership, Iran negotiated with the US and the European Union to limit its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of some sanctions. However, he does not enjoy widespread support among conservatives or parts of society, making him an unlikely figure — unless the regime decides to demonstrate a willingness to improve relations with the West.

2. Regime Adjustment

One possible scenario is not a complete overthrow of power, but its partial reformatting. A similar example recently occurred in Venezuela. After US military forces detained Nicolas Maduro, the opposition expected a complete change of regime. However, instead, his vice-president, Delcy Rodriguez, took power — apparently with the tacit consent of the US. She preserved the main state structures but agreed to fulfill a number of Washington's demands, including those related to foreign policy and oil supplies.

In Iran, a similar figure who could become a compromise option is not yet apparent. However, attention is drawn to the head of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani. He is an experienced diplomat and a seasoned negotiator on nuclear issues. In the West, he is known as a universal "problem-solver" for the regime. After the bombings, Larijani remained alive, which many considered significant.

Although on the surface he remains a harsh critic of Western and Israeli power, his name is often mentioned as someone "we can do business with," as Margaret Thatcher once said about Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. This would be a path of soft course correction without the complete destruction of the state apparatus.

3. Complete Regime Change

The third path is the fulfillment of the hopes of thousands of Iranians who rose in protest in January. Proponents of this scenario in the US are pressuring Trump, demanding the establishment of a pro-Western democracy.

The main media figure here is Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah. He enjoys Netanyahu's moral support and offers himself as a transitional leader for the creation of a constitutional monarchy. However, the memory of his father's regime still evokes a mixed reaction within the country.

Another player is the "People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran" (MEK). It has long enjoyed the support of a number of Western politicians, especially from the right-wing camp. Its leader is considered to be Maryam Rajavi. To some observers, she appears closer to traditional Iranian society than the Western-oriented urban activists who support Pahlavi.

However, the MEK has a complex and controversial history. In the past, the organization combined Islamic rhetoric with Marxist ideas and used violent methods. Today, it claims to have abandoned its radical past and advocates for democracy, and it indeed has some support within Iran.

Nevertheless, the question remains open as to whether Pahlavi, Rajavi, or any other leader will be able to unite diverse Iranian society and create a stable pro-Western democratic system. Many experts view such a possibility with caution.

4. Disintegration and Chaos

Journalists note that Iran, unlike Iraq, is not a religious "powder keg" due to the dominance of its Shia majority. However, according to them, this does not guarantee stability. The risk of destabilization is linked to ethnic contradictions.

In the east of the country, a Baloch insurgency with clear features of Sunni jihadism has been smoldering for decades. Large-scale explosions have occurred in the region, including in Shia mosques.

In the north, a numerous Kurdish population resides, where radical dissident movements are active — some of them armed, some connected with various structures of the Kurdish political scene, including the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is banned in Turkey. Kurdish cities were among the most active centers of recent anti-government protests.

Additionally, Iran has Arab regions — predominantly Shia, but partially Sunni as well — as well as a significant Azerbaijani Shia community, which is largely integrated into national life, though not entirely.

The authors of The Times note: if, as a result of continuous bombings, police stations, headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other security structures are destroyed, a power vacuum will form in Iran. In such conditions, the opposition and separatist factions could resort to open violence. Instead of a pro-Western democracy, the world risks getting a territory of uncontrolled chaos, where various radical groups will fight for control over the ruins of the former Islamic Republic.

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