"For us, the BPF, Shushkevich's nomination was a stab in the back." Naumchyk and Statkevich Clarify the Role of the Belarusian Military Association

In his Telegram post, Statkevich, among other things, wrote:

"BZW units emerged in garrisons throughout Belarus. And the ceremony of taking the oath of allegiance to Belarus held on September 8, 1992, on Independence Square in Minsk made it possible to create BZW units from reserve servicemen in all districts of the capital.

The BZW achieved the creation of the Belarusian army, initiated the establishment of the Anti-Crisis Committee of all major political forces of the country for the defense of independence, organized the writing and publication in newspapers (with a total circulation of one and a half million copies) of a brief overview of the previously forbidden military history of Belarus "Forgotten Glory," and regularly held mass celebrations of the dates of military victories of our ancestors.

On March 25, 1993, after Kebich's government announced its intention to abandon the national currency and switch to the Russian ruble, the BZW held a march in defense of independence on Minsk's main avenue under the slogan: "People, defend yourselves!" Thousands of men, to the beat of drums, led by BZW activists, marched in formation along Francysk Skaryna Avenue. This made a great impression on the government, and they abandoned the introduction of a foreign currency. But after this, the Supreme Soviet decided to amend the law "On the Status of Servicemen," according to which servicemen were prohibited from engaging in any "socio-political" activities, which the authorities interpreted not only as a ban on participating in the work of political parties, but also in the activities of any public organizations. Even "dog breeders' societies," as they said.

As a result, patriotic officers were faced with a choice — military service or BZW membership. The most annoying thing is that these amendments to the law were supported by the BPF faction. To this day, the motives why the leadership of this party helped Kebich's government crack down on a patriotic organization of officers are unclear to me. Could it be out of банальная jealousy for the growing popularity of a public organization? It was not for nothing that the then Minister of Defense Kazlouski joyfully shouted to me across the hall in the presence of an officers' meeting at the Military Academy: "The BPF betrayed you!"

The BZW leadership, to avoid the dismissal of its comrades from the army, decided to cease the membership of all regular officers in the organization, except for the chairman of the organization. As a result, the BZW was left without experienced activists and presence in the army. The organization suffered a strong blow. And later, in early 1994, due to the participation of its members in guarding a workers' strike, it was deprived of legal registration. After which it was registered under a different name."

Statkevich's accusation that the BPF was allegedly complicit in "cracking down on a patriotic organization of officers" provoked a sharp reaction from Siarhei Naumchyk, who posted his view of those events on his Facebook page. In his opinion, the BZW is "an integral page of recent history, which in the future, I am convinced, will grow into books and doctoral dissertations." However,

"Unfortunately, in his post, the esteemed Mikalai Statkevich failed to fully maintain objectivity, attributing all the patriotic initiatives he listed exclusively to the BZW, while diminishing the role of the BPF and its parliamentary faction."

And then he explains how, in his opinion, everything really was:

"I will not write in detail how the 75th anniversary of the BPR was organized by the BPF Opposition, within which the BZW march mentioned by Mikalai Statkevich also took place. I will only note the main point: BPF deputies took responsibility for almost all large-scale mass actions, using their deputy opportunities. The same applies, by the way, to the now legendary oath of September 8, 1992. As well as to the Anti-Crisis Committee, which Statkevich mentions.

Павялічыць

Let's be frank: without the deputies, neither KGB Chairman Shyrkouski, nor Minister of Internal Affairs Yahorau, nor other officials would have even listened to any of the BZW leaders. I'm not saying this is right — on the contrary, it was a vicious practice, but only deputy status guaranteed (according to the Law on the Status of a Deputy) the holding of certain events.

Unfortunately, the march to Kebich's government did not make the impression Statkevich writes about. Which is not surprising: a government that controlled an almost hundred-thousand-strong armed army could not be intimidated by a march of, albeit patriotically-minded, self-sacrificing, but unarmed people (of course, reserve officers — BZW activists — had no weapons).

The memory of the esteemed Mikalai Statkevich also fails him in that as a result of this march "the introduction of a foreign currency was abandoned." On the contrary.

A few months later, on September 8, 1993, an Agreement on the Unification of the Monetary Systems of the Republic of Belarus with the Monetary System of the Russian Federation was signed in Moscow, which provided for the introduction of the Russian ruble as the single means of payment. From the Russian Federation, it was signed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation Viktor Gerashchenko; from Belarus — by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Vyachaslau Kebich and Chairman of the Board of the National Bank Stanislau Bahdankevich.

The process developed on January 5, 1994, when Chernomyrdin and Gerashchenko announced the transition to the Russian ruble, and Gerashchenko and Bahdankevich signed the infamous "Interbank Agreement," which outlined the mechanism for burying the Belarusian banking system. And on April 12, 1994, in the same Moscow, the final Agreement on the Unification of the Monetary Systems of Belarus and Russia was signed. Fortunately, the unification did not happen: Moscow wanted to completely subordinate the National Bank of Belarus, the leadership of the National Bank did not agree with this, and in May 1994, it was forced to declare the Belarusian ruble the sole legal tender."

Naturally, Siarhei Naumchyk could not ignore Statkevich's alleged accusation of "betrayal" of the BZW by the BPF, when opposition deputies supported the law "On the Status of Servicemen," which prohibited regular servicemen from participating in socio-political activities. He explains the true motivation behind that decision:

"As for "jealousy" — there was none and could not have been: no contemporary polls recorded the popularity of BZW leaders even within the margin of arithmetic error; this can easily be verified by leafing through the official and independent press of that time.

Non-participation of servicemen in political activity (or activity that has a distinct political character) is a generally accepted norm in democratic countries. Or in those striving for democracy.

With the same success, one could reproach the same BPF deputies for achieving the depoliticization of enterprises (which for a long time was one of the main slogans of democratic forces) — because not only supporters of Marxism-Leninism, but also activists of the BPF and democratic parties themselves, were removed from beyond the factory gates or research institutes.

A law cannot be selective in nature.

It was probably possible not to support the law. But then, in military units, the actually restored communist party, and chauvinistic, pro-imperial organizations, which became active precisely in 1993 (and, I remind you, supported both Kebich and Lukashenka), would have been fully active.

It's a great pity that, remembering Minister of Defense Kazlouski's outcry that the BPF supposedly "betrayed" his comrades, the esteemed Mikalai Statkevich forgets something else.

It was precisely the BPF Opposition, at the legislative level (I emphasize: not in the form of articles in the press, but — bills), that put forward the proposal for the return of Belarusian officers from former USSR republics to their homeland, their employment in the Belarusian army. Moreover: a committee "Return" was organized, headed by BPF Opposition deputy Halina Siamdzianava. Hundreds of Belarusian officers were returned (unfortunately, not all). And it was precisely the BPF Opposition that organized an action to support BZW officers who began to be dismissed from the army (even before the adoption of the mentioned amendments to the law). And it was precisely BPF activists who collected signatures for a letter in support of the BZW, which was signed by public and cultural figures, including Vasil Bykau — and the BPF parliamentary opposition in its entirety."

Further, Naumchyk not only defends the good name of the BPF but also goes on the offensive, mentioning other nuances of the political life of that time:

"Incidentally, I am not aware of a single word of support for the BZW (at least, publicly) from a person who played an incomparably greater role than all those signatories combined — from Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislau Shushkevich. Whom, in early 1994, Mikalai Statkevich nominated as a presidential candidate at a plenum of the BSDP leadership; Statkevich's absolute right, but, it seems, the ex-speaker was immediately forgiven for his actual position of inaction, whereas BPF deputies are being presented with unfair phantom claims decades later.

The deletion of the BPF and its parliamentary faction from national history has become systematic and no longer surprises me, and it is a pity that Mikalai Statkevich has joined this.

It is very unpleasant for me to refute, argue, clarify — especially when I have to do this in relation to authors with whom, I believe, despite all disagreements, we had and still have a common goal — the independence of Belarus.

But there are not many of us, deputies, left; every year someone departs to Eternity, and as the former coordinator of the BPF Opposition in the Supreme Soviet-12, I consider it my duty to do this — if only for the memory of those who can no longer respond."

Statkevich did not leave this long text unanswered, conveying explanations regarding what was stated in it through his comrade Siarhei Sparysh. In his opinion, Siarhei Naumchyk "forgot some details":

"Yes, the action dedicated to the anniversary of Freedom Day was initiated and prepared by the BPF. But the BZW was also preparing for it, to hold the well-known march in defense of independence. Only we did it not in newspapers, but personally.

We formed our district units with the help of lists of reserve servicemen who took the oath on September 8, 1992 (about which, including the BPF's role in its preparation, I recently wrote), after which they signed and left their contact information. Afterwards, we worked with them, held district meetings where unit leaders were elected. We made the decision about the march together with them, and through this network, we gathered people for the march.

The action was joint. A BPF demonstration and a BZW march. Only significantly fewer people participated in the demonstration than in the March. Which, apparently, displeased the organizers of the demonstration.

Now about the effect of the March: a real hysteria began in state media and the Supreme Soviet. The March was called "the march of militants." The amendments to the law "On the Status of Servicemen" were adopted because of this, and all deputies perfectly understood that they were specifically aimed at liquidating the BZW. Two deputies from the BPF faction who were members of the BZW (Liavon Dzieika and Vital Malashka) faced pressure from the faction leader but refused to support the amendments against the BZW.

The agreement on the transition to the Russian ruble was already being prepared for signing. After the March, Kebich delayed and closed the topic in his characteristic manner — by delays, postponements, and additional negotiations.

Siarhei, apparently, forgot that in 1991 he, along with the Supreme Soviet, banned the activities of the Communist Party in Belarus. After some time, the ban was lifted, but to imagine that this then already retired club would be able to create its sinister cells in the army, where communists lost all respect among officers after humbly obeying the command "Disperse!", one needs a rich imagination.

If you watch the video of the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the BPR (it can, it seems, be seen on the historical project Gazetaby under the title "March of Militants"), you can see a striking difference between the BPF demonstration and the BZW march. Both in terms of numbers and energy.

After the BPF's failed attempt to dissolve the Supreme Soviet through a referendum appointed by the Supreme Soviet itself (!), the authority of this party fell. Very few people attended its actions. One could say that the BZW saved the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the BPR with its participation. And they were "thanked" for it."

Statkevich also answered Naumchyk's question why his Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada party supported Stanislau Shushkevich in the 1994 presidential elections instead of Zianon Pazniak, even though the latter had not supported the referendum initiated by the BPF in 1992 on re-election of the Supreme Soviet under new political conditions, and later allegedly said nothing in support of BZW members being dismissed from the army:

"Because they understood the absence of his (Pazniak's. — Ed.) chances of winning, including due to his detachment from the real problems and concerns of the majority of voters, and a misunderstanding of these problems and concerns. Many members of Hramada — deputies of the BPF faction — were also wary of Pazniak's leadership style. And the members of the BZW leadership remembered who contributed to the destruction of their organization. Why Shushkevich? Because there were no other equally well-known Belarusian-speaking politicians.

It is not true that the referendum did not take place due to Shushkevich's fault. Because the referendum is appointed by the Supreme Soviet by a majority of votes. How can one not understand people to think that the majority of deputies would vote to deprive themselves of paid and privileged work? If the vote on the referendum had not been scheduled, its outcome would have been the same.

Павялічыць

The ставка on collecting 400 thousand votes just for submitting a proposal for a referendum to the Supreme Soviet, which would decide whether to hold the referendum, was a knowingly losing, exhausting strategy that caused a crisis of confidence in national forces."

Siarhei Naumchyk then extensively commented on Facebook on these statements by Statkevich, also promising to include them without any cuts in the text of his book "Ninety-Fourth" when it is reissued. But at the same time, he emphasized:

"We then did not say a word of reproach to our colleagues from the BSDP, but for us, Front members, that nomination of Shushkevich was "a stab in the back" (however, after the withdrawal of the signatures of BSDP deputies for Karpenka, which resulted in Henadz's withdrawal from the elections, it was somewhat inappropriate to express claims).

And he continues to present his vision of those fateful events in Belarusian history:

"Reproaching BPF deputies for the liquidation of the BZW (which the esteemed Mikalai does systematically) is, to put it mildly, unfair. But I have already given arguments on this matter, I will not repeat myself.

Regarding the non-support of Pazniak and the nomination of Shushkevich.

First, I remind you that the BSDP faction in its entirety was part of the BPF Opposition in the Supreme Soviet-12, and its leader Aleh Trusau (after the death of Mikhas Tkachou — and the party chairman) was the deputy chairman of the BPF Opposition Zianon Pazniak. We jointly developed bills, economic programs, together organized mass and other actions. I could go months without mentioning that Deputy A. was a member of the BSDP, and Deputy B. was a member of the BPF. We were like one whole.

Павялічыць

I did not hear a single word or half-word from Statkevich himself, nor from any of the "Hramada members" in 1990-1994, regarding "Pazniak's leadership style."

Even though at the Opposition meetings we spoke absolutely frankly, if necessary, we criticized each other's proposals and actions, and Pazniak was by no means an exception (for example, I personally constantly argued with Zianon Stanislavovich about his relationship with journalists). Believe me, in our (Opposition deputies') discussions, tensions reached a very high level, some details will go with me to the grave. But what the esteemed Mikalai writes about, I did not hear from anyone.

Just as I did not hear criticism of the idea of holding a referendum from the BSDP — with the exception of one case, when at the BPF Soim, Deputy Chairman of the Minsk City Council and BSDP member Anatol Hurynovich expressed doubt that the referendum would be successful. And I wrote about this in my book "Ninety-Second."

While working on it, I studied all available documents and all available press — from them it follows that the esteemed Mikalai Statkevich expressed no doubts, said nothing similar to what he writes now. Perhaps I overlooked something — I would be grateful if he could present a contemporary publication in which he opposed the referendum and cited his current arguments.

But, as is known, the BSDP supported the referendum. I note that when the BPF Board stated that the BSDP leadership did not immediately support the idea of a referendum (the reason, if I am not mistaken, was that very speech by Hurynovich), BSDP leader Mikhas Tkachou refuted this in the newspaper "Svaboda." Quote: "Why accuse Hramada of allegedly not immediately supporting the idea of a referendum" ("Svaboda," No. 1, February 1992). In general, Tkachou was not the kind of person who, seeing the futility of an idea, the implementation of which would require enormous efforts, including from his party, would remain silent and not state it publicly.

Павялічыць

Thus, the BSDP (like all other democratic parties without exception) advocated for the referendum. And that was correct: a referendum on early parliamentary elections was the only legal way to change the government, which did not meet the needs of the newly restored Belarusian state.

"How can one not understand people to think that the majority of deputies would vote to deprive themselves of paid and privileged work?" — writes Statkevich. Sounds nice, but does not correspond to reality:

in August '91, that same majority of deputies voted to cease the activities of the CPSU, depriving themselves of work in the Central Committee, regional committees (obkoms), and district committees (raykoms). Not to mention that they voted for Independence, which they fiercely opposed the day before. By Statkevich's logic, we shouldn't have even sought to convene the Independence Session — because what's the point, they wouldn't vote anyway.

They voted under the influence of circumstances, the impact of public sentiment, and pressure from BPF Opposition deputies.

And public sentiment at the end of 1991, when the idea of a referendum was put forward, was in favor of changing the government. And in the spring of '92, when the necessary signatures were collected — also. The mood was quite sufficient to pressure the Supreme Soviet.

Yes, Shushkevich could not call a referendum, but he could (and was obliged to) convene a session as soon as the signatures were collected. He could have done this earlier, with his then-rating of public trust at 52%, by initiating it himself. But he did not even do what he was supposed to do, based on what the BPF, BSDP, and other organizations had already prepared.

I will quote a fragment of an article by Yuras Khadyka (incidentally, Pazniak's main opponent within the BPF): "During the collection of signatures in February-March 1992, he opposed this campaign by various means, ridiculing either the wording or the timing of the elections. He contributed to the fact that the results of the Central Election Commission's work, ready by early May, were not considered at the spring session of the Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviet itself went on a six-month vacation" ("Svaboda," February 6, 1994).

Just think, already outside the topic of the referendum: not even a year had passed since the renewed state, every day was decisive — and Shushkevich dissolves the Supreme Soviet for a six-month vacation! The BPF Opposition, including BSDP deputies, constantly demanded that he convene a session, but to no avail.

As a result, the session was convened only in the autumn, when the situation had changed: a deep economic and social crisis forced the population to think no longer about politics, but about basic physical survival. Activity gave way to apathy. And the ban on the referendum did not cause a public outcry. As a politician with extensive experience, Mikalai Statkevich perfectly knows that an economic crisis does not always generate political activity, and that public sentiment can change within a few months, let alone a year.

At the session itself, Shushkevich actively opposed the referendum.

We (the BPF, but not only — Statkevich also, because then he was with us, at least there was no reason to think otherwise) indeed made one mistake — we did not foresee Shushkevich's betrayal. But we should have — because he repeatedly gave cause for it (as, for example, during the April strike of '91, when he sided with the nomenklatura).

And for this mistake, I take my share of responsibility."

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