Can Belarus become democratic with Putin alive? Karbalevich on Lukashenka's fears and what will happen after him

Belarusian authorities are trying to establish relations with the West, while not abandoning their alliance with Russia and supporting its war against Ukraine. Negotiations with the Americans have already yielded certain results, but there is no talk yet of significant changes in Minsk's domestic policy.

Karbalevich believes that Washington is not posing the question of ending repressions and democratizing the country to Lukashenka, as it is primarily focused on realistic tasks that can be resolved under current conditions.

“For example, to detach Belarus from Russia — that is hardly possible, so they don't pose such a question. Perhaps they believe that at the moment, ending repressions is unlikely. Therefore, they don't pose this and try to achieve some realistic things. It's a pragmatic approach,” he explains.

At the same time, Karbalevich disagrees with the opinion that political prisoners are Lukashenka's main resource in negotiations with the West.

“I think that the factor of the war in Ukraine is still more important. The fact that Belarus is an ally of Russia, the fact that Lukashenka's regime supports Russia in this war,” the analyst emphasizes.

The main Western sanctions against Belarus were precisely related to its support for Russia. For Europe, security issues and the role that Belarusian territory could play in Moscow's further military plans have now come to the forefront.

Therefore, European countries link the improvement of relations with Minsk not only to the release of political prisoners and the cessation of repressions, but also to a change in Belarus's policy regarding the war.

Lukashenka has strong reasons not to get involved in the war

Karbalevich estimates the likelihood of Belarus directly entering the war against Ukraine at four out of ten points. In his opinion, Lukashenka is primarily restrained by the sentiments of Belarusian society, and this is not just about opponents of the authorities.

“Everyone opposes the war, opposes Belarus's participation in the war. Both Lukashenka's supporters and opponents, and the nomenclature, and the security forces. On this issue, there is almost a consensus in Belarus today. Belarusian society is very deeply divided, but on this issue, there is a consensus in Belarus,” the political scientist notes.

As Karbalevich argues, even under a personal dictatorship, Lukashenka is forced to reckon with these sentiments. If he decided to send Belarusians to the front, he would have to explain why they should die. In Russia, according to the analyst, Putin managed to draw society into the war thanks to imperial sentiments and notions of state grandeur. In Belarus, there is no such basis for mobilization.

Another important reason for Lukashenka's caution lies in the danger of Ukrainian strikes on Belarusian territory.

“Until today, Lukashenka was confident that he was under a Russian military umbrella. Supposedly, nuclear weapons appeared here, Oreshnik missiles are here, and if anything, Russia would protect [Belarus] in any military conflict. Well, now it has turned out that Russia cannot protect itself. Ukrainian drones fly across the entire European part of Russia,” the political scientist argues.

The political scientist points out that Lukashenka himself, in an interview with Al-Arabiya TV channel, acknowledged Belarus's vulnerability to Ukrainian drones.

“This Russian military umbrella, it's full of holes, and it won't protect Belarus,” Karbalevich concludes.

In his view, this largely explains Minsk's current peace-loving statements and attempts to establish relations with the West, including proposals by Foreign Minister Maksim Ryzhenkov regarding conflict resolution with neighbors.

Who will win the war and when to expect a window of opportunity

Karbalevich assesses Ukraine's chances of victory rather reservedly — at three to four out of ten points. He gives Russia six points. At the same time, in his opinion, the outcome of the war will be of fundamental importance for the future of Belarus. If Ukraine does not win, "it will be a poor outcome" for Belarus.

Among other factors that could open a window of opportunity for political changes, the analyst names the future of Lukashenka and Putin in power.

To the question of what to do if this window doesn't open for another ten to fifteen years, Karbalevich replies that he doesn't expect such a long period without significant events. He acknowledges that European history knows both the Thirty Years' War and the Hundred Years' War, but he doesn't think that the current war in Ukraine will last for decades.

“I think it's unlikely we'll have to wait ten years,” says the political scientist.

Democratic Belarus with Putin alive?

Karbalevich does not rule out that Lukashenka will leave power earlier than Putin. Moreover, even the preservation of Russia's current leadership, in his opinion, does not necessarily make democratic changes in Belarus impossible.

The political scientist explains his position by the fact that Moscow's ability to keep neighboring countries under its influence is gradually diminishing.

“Look, all neighbors from the post-Soviet space are gradually distancing themselves from Russia. Some quickly, others slowly, but in fact, Belarus is the only country that Russia has managed to keep so close. I think this is not the exception that proves the rule, and Belarus will still be able to break away from Russia, not immediately, gradually, but inevitably,” the analyst predicts.

However, this does not mean that democracy will immediately be established in Belarus after Lukashenka. Karbalevich considers it more likely that a softer authoritarian regime will initially emerge, including if power passes to someone from the current leadership.

Any successor will trample on Lukashenka's legacy

The political scientist notes that in personalist regimes, a political crisis often arises after the departure of a long-term leader. In such systems, there is no normal mechanism for the transfer of power, so its redistribution can be accompanied by sharp conflicts.

Karbalevich believes that Lukashenka himself is aware of this problem and is looking for ways to preserve his political legacy. He names the creation of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly as one such attempt, but doubts that it will help ensure the immutability of the regime.

“He understands that if he is gone, everything will start to change. And it will change not in the direction he wants. And they will trample on his name to legitimize themselves. He understands this but doesn't see mechanisms for preserving his legacy. And this breaks through in his various remarks. And so far, he has no plan for what to do after he, say, must somehow leave.”

At the same time, the political scientist rates Lukashenka's current ability to maintain power within the country very highly — at nine out of ten points. But his international political weight, considering his great dependence on Russia, is only at three points.

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